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ARTICLES 
JUST SO STORIES: POSNERIAN 
METHODOLOGY 
Jeanne L. Schroeder* 
Hear and attend and listen; for this befell and behappened 
and became and was... 
INTRODUCTION 
At the turn of the last century, Rudyard Kipling spun fantastic 
yams that supposedly explained how certain surprising facts about 
the world came about. The Just So Stories^ drew from sources as 
diverse as Eastern mythology and Western paleontology to speculate 
on the causes of not only natural curiosities, such as how the camel 
got his hump, but also cultural ones, such as how the alphabet was 
made. 
At the turn of this century. Judge Richard Posner, the doyen of 
the law-and-economics movement, draws from sources as diverse as 
economics and socio-biology to spin fantastic yams that supposedly 
explain not only legal curiosities, such as how the tort system came 
about, but also social ones, such as why mothers love their children. 
Kipling implicitly understood that although "abduction"^—the 
post hoc imagining of explanatory stories—can play an essential role 
in scientific inquiry, it is merely a means of forming, not proving, 
hypotheses. One can easily abduct explanations that, while sounding 
plausible within their context, appear fantastic when examined more 
fully. Consequently, Kipling created his just so stories as fairy tales 
* Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law. 
1 RUDYARD KIPLING, JUST SO STORIES 177 (Everyman's Library Children's Qassics 
1992) (1902). 
2 According to the editor's notes to the Everyman's Library Children's Classics edition, 
the title of the collection reflects that Kipling's children, with their infantile love of repetition 
and precision, always insisted that the stories be repeated word for word—"just so." Of 
course, the title also suggests that the author was jokingly asserting that the stories were true, 
and things did, in fact, occur "just so." See id. at Editor's Comments. 
3 See discussion infra Part II.B.3. 
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for the amusement of his daughter." In contrast, Posner claims his 
just so stories are scientific theories for the edification of the legal 
community. He wants his audience to accept his economic analysis 
not merely as an account of past legal developments, but as a model 
for future ones.® 
Posner's most recent foray into methodological issues appears 
in a vociferous reply to the rather modest suggestion by Professors 
Christine JoUs, Cass Sunstein, and Richard Thaler ("JST") that legal 
scholars might wish to consider the imphcations of certain recent 
empirical economic research on decision making.® Posner accuses 
JST of a failure to grasp not only the economic theory of rational 
choice, but also the very nature of scientific theory per se.^ And yet, 
Posner's reply evinces both a highly idiosyncratic definition of 
rationality and an ad hoc argument that strays far afield from the 
methodology that usually underlies economics' claim to scientific 
status. 
This Article is one part of a three-part critique of Posner's 
conception of economic rationality. In Rationality in Law and 
Economics Scholarship,^ I explore at length the degeneration of 
Posner's conception of rationality from the elegant, if simplistic, 
model drawn from neoclassical economics to its current ad hoc state. 
Indeed, all that seems to be left of the "rational" component of 
4 Kipling wrote the just so stories for Josephine, his favorite child The narrator addresses 
each story to her as his "Best Beloved," and she is no doubt the model for the "little girl-
daughter" heroine of several of the stories. Sadly, she died at the age of six before the stories 
appeared in print in 1902. This might account for the palpable sense of melancholy that 
haunts the author's enigmatic illustrations to what are supposed to be humorous stories. 
5 As Posner himself notes, wealth maximization has both positive and normative aspects. 
The former posits "that the common law is best understood on the 'as if assumption that 
judges try to maximize the wealth of society." RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 
172-73 (1995) [hereinafter POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW]. The latter posits that "judges 
should interpret... antitrust statutes to make them conform to the dictates of wealth 
maximization." Id. at 173; see also Lewis A. Kornhauser, Wealth Maximization, in THE NEW 
PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 679 (Peter Newman ed., 1998). 
Even Posner now admits that "[n]ot all questions that come up in law, however, can be 
effortlessly recast as economic questions." POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW, supra, at 22 
(discussing abortion specifically); see Kornhauser, supra, at 682 ("In recent years, Posner has 
weakened his claim from one that asserted that common law courts should be exclusively 
concerned with wealth maximization to one that asserts that wealth maximization is one of the 
values that common law courts ought to pursue."). 
6 See Christine lolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law 
and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1551 (1998) [hereinafter Jolls et al.. Behavioral 
Approach]. For consistency, I shall follow Posner's awkward lead and refer to Professors 
Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler as though they were a single triple-bodied Geryon. See Richard A. 
Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1551, 1551 
(1998) [hereinafter Posner, Behavioral Economics]. 
7 See infra Part II. A. 
8 Jeanne L. Schroeder, Rationality in Law and Economics Scholarship, 79 ORE. L. REV. 
147 (2000) [hereinafter Schroeder, Economic Rationality]. 
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Posnerian rationality is the affirmative normative connotations of 
the term itself. In Fear of Freedom: A Polemic Against Policy f I 
contrast the concept of rationahty as used in neoclassical economics 
with that used in the speculative philosophic tradition. Economic 
rationality is consequentialist reasoning: choosing an appropriate 
means to achieve a pre-given end. In contrast, speculative rationality 
is the process by which a subject determines an appropriate end. 
Economists assume that rational behavior is predictable and that 
irrationality is the source of unpredictability. The speculative 
philosopher believes that irrationality can be rigidly predictable 
whereas rationality, which is grounded in freedom, is the source of 
true spontaneity. 
In this Article, I examine the methodology that Posner claims to 
follow and the methodology that he actually follows in developing 
his account of rationality. Posner presents his methodology as being 
standard within economics. He states that, in science and economics 
(and, presumably, law), theories must be instrumental in nature, and 
that the only appropriate purpose of an economic theory is 
prediction. I show that not all economists—let alone scientists, 
philosophers, or legal theorists—agree with the assessment that 
science should be primarily useful, like engineering, and adopt a 
number of alternative goals, such as description, explanation, and 
understanding. 
I believe that Posner concentrates on the goal of prediction 
because he sees law and economics as a form of policy science. That 
is, he wishes to use the law to manipulate legal and economic 
subjects to act in such a way in order to further a societal goal, such 
as wealth maximization. In contrast, speculative theory and critical 
legal theory seek not so much to predict behavior, but to understand 
the law. liie critical theorist does not identify with the legislator or 
judge who writes and interprets the law, but with the attorney who 
advises and represents the individual citizen who is subjected to the 
law. The critical theorist seeks to understand how she and others fit 
within the legal system, in order to free herself from its manipulation 
and, if possible, manipulate the law for her own individual, 
subjective purposes. I develop this point extensively elsewhere^" and 
shall touch on it only briefly in this Article. 
Posner identifies his methodology with the widely adopted 
scientific methodology of falsification. Once again, not all 
9 Jeanne L. Schroeder, Fear of Freedom: A Polemic Against Policy (2000) (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with author) [hereinafter Schroeder, Fear of Freedom]. 
10 See Jeanne L. Schroeder, The Four Discourses: A Lacanian Analysis of Legal Practice 
and Scholarship, 79 TEX. L. REV. 15 (2000) [hereinafter Schroeder, The Four Discourses\, 
Jeanne L. Schroeder, The Flysterical Attorney, 13 INT'LJ.L. & SEMIOTICS 181 (2000). 
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philosophers, scientists, or economists (let alone legal theorists) 
agree that falsification is the only appropriate methodology, or even 
that it is appropriate at all. Nevertheless, it is certainly a widely 
accepted one." Posner does not, however, address directly the 
extensive hterature on scientific methodology, but bases his brief 
methodological discussions on Milton Friedman's notoriously 
controversial essay. The Methodology of Positive Economics^ In 
this Article, I briefly describe Friedman's thesis and discuss the 
avalanche of criticism it has received. I show that Posner 
concentrates precisely on the most idiosyncratic and controversial 
portion of Friedman's work—what Friedman's critics call the F-twist, 
or the unreaUty principle. Indeed, Posner gives the F-twist an 
additional turn of the screw, taking it to a logical extreme that 
perhaps should be christened the F-twist. Because Posner claims to 
follow falsification, I give a brief discussion of the standard account 
of falsification, which was developed by the philosopher of science 
Karl Popper, and show how Posner confuses falsification with the 
unreliable methodology of verification. Consequently, although 
Posner accuses JST of proposing ad hoc nonfalsifiable hypotheses,'^ 
JST is correct in counteraccusing Posner of precisely the same sin.'" 
I, nevertheless, conclude by suggesting that in his recent work 
Posner might have stumbled onto the first step in the "sophisticated 
falsification" methodology explicated by philosopher of science Imre 
Lakatos and promoted by economic historian Mark Blaug. Posner is 
correct that a sophisticated falsifier does not abandon the "hard 
core" of his working hypothesis merely because he observes data 
that at first blush seem to be inconsistent with it—such as the 
observations of behavioral economists that seem inconsistent with 
the rationality postulate of neoclassical price theory. Rather, the 
sophisticated falsifier first uses "abduction" to attempt to formulate 
a protective belt of auxihary hypotheses—or post hoc 
explanations—that might account for the anomaly and thereby 
11 The preeminence of falsification methodology is probably less widely accepted by 
scientists and philosophers of science than lawyers seem to assume. See infra text 
accompanying notes 129-50. In my theoretical work I rely heavily on the theories of G.W.F. 
Hegel and Jacques Lacan. Although Popper's critiques of Hegelianism and psychoanalysis 
are notoriously controversial, I believe that he is correct when he says that Hegelian and 
Lacanian theory are probably not scientific in the sense of being falsifiable. They are not 
based on inductive reasoning from empirical evidence but on the retroactive deductive 
method known as the dialectic. 
12 MILTON FRIEDMAN, The Methodology of Positive Economics, in ESSAYS IN POSITIVE 
ECONOMICS 3 (1984). 
13 See Posner, Behavioral Economics, supra note 6, at 1560. 
I'l See Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, Theories and Tropes: A Reply to 
Posner and Kelman, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1593, 1659-60 (1998) [hereinafter Jolls et al.. Theories 
and Tropes] (referring specifically to Posner's use of evolutionary biology). 
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buffer the hard core from attack. This is exactly what Posner does; 
he does not, however, follow through with the implications of this 
methodology. Mere abduction of auxiliary hypotheses is a 
necessary, but not a sufficient, methodology. The scientist must 
further test his auxiliary hypotheses. 
I. FRIEDMAN'S CONTROVERSIAL ESSAY ON METHODOLOGY 
This, O Best Beloved, is another story of the high and Far-
Off TimesP 
A. Controversy 
Posner's methodology is based largely on Milton Friedman's 
famous, or infamous, essay The Methodology of Positive 
Economics^ Many practitioners of "law and economics" have 
accepted Posner's claim that this is the methodology generally 
accepted by economists." While Friedman's essay has been highly 
15 KIPLING, supra note 1, at 93. 
16 FRIEDMAN, supra note 12. While Posner does not always credit Friedman, his 
descriptions of "economic" methodology closely track the methodology described in 
Friedman's essay. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 18-19 (5th 
ed. 1998) [hereinafter POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS]. 
17 A quick Lexis search reveals hterally scores of articles that cite Friedman's essay as 
though it represented standard economic theory. For articles that refer specifically to 
predictive power as being the only test of a theory, see, for example, Stephen M. Bainbridge, 
Community and Statism: A Conservative Contractarian Critique of Progressive Corporate Law 
Scholarship, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 856,871 (1997) (book review); Paul L. Colby & Robert H. 
Klonoff, Sponsorship Strategy.- A Reply to Floyd Abrams and Professor Saks, 1993 MD. L. 
REV. 458, 473 (1993); Thomas F. Cotter, Legal Pragmatism and the Law and Economics 
Movement, 89 GEO. L.J. 2071, 2116 (1996); Lawrence A. Cunningham, From Random Walks 
to Chaotic Crashes: The Linear Genealogy of the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis, 62 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 546, 559 (1994); Jeffery L. Dunoff & Joel P. Trachtman, The Law and 
Economics of Humanitarian Law Violations in Internal Conflicts, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 394, 406 
(1999); Donald C. Langevoort, Theories, Assumptions, and Securities Regulation: Market 
Efficiency Revisited, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 851,861 (1992); Daniel Ostas, Postmodern Economic 
Analysis of Law: Extending the Pragmatic Vision of Richard A. Posner, 36 AM. BUS. L.J. 193, 
221 n.l75 (1998). Surprisingly, Langevoort cites Blaug's discussion of Friedman's essay 
without noting that Blaug is not only very critical of Friedman, but that he presents Friedman 
as only one of many contemporary methodological schools within economics. See 
Langevoort, supra, at 861 n.32. 
Occasionally one does find authors who are aware of the methodological controversy 
within economics. See, e.g., Robert B. Seidman, Ann Seidman & Neva Makgetla, Big Bangs 
and Decision Making: What Went Wrong?, 13 B.U. INT'LL.J. 435,444 n.61 (1995) (noting that 
Friedman's "proposition has undergone withering criticism"); Mark Tushnet, Interdisciplinary 
Legal Scholarship: The Case of History-in-Law, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 909, 910 n.8 (1996). 
Tushnet states: 
[0]n the rare occasions that practitioners of law and economics attempt to offer 
more than the most superficial reasons why economics has something to say to 
law, they tend to rely almost entirely on Milton Friedman's famous essay on the 
methodology of positive economics, without acknowledging that Friedman's 
account of economic methodology is highly contested among philosophers of 
economics. 
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influential, it is not, as Posner implies, generally accepted among 
economists. It lies, for example, at the heart of differences not only 
within neoclassical economics, such as that between Friedman and 
Paul Samuelson, but also those between the Chicago school of 
neoclassical economics associated with Friedman and the Carnegie 
school of behavioral economics founded by Herbert Simon.^^ 
In this Part, I show that on the one hand, certain parts of 
Friedman's essay can be interpreted to be consistent with standard 
accounts of falsification, albeit formulated in a highly idiosjmcratic 
and potentially misleading way. On the other hand, Friedman's odd 
wording is also consistent with a radical nominalism that threatens to 
divorce theory from truth entirely. It is this latter interpretation that 
has been dubbed the F-twist, or the unreality principle,^' by 
Friedman's detractors.^" Even Blaug, who struggles mightily to 
reconcile Friedman's views with more mainstream accounts of 
scientific methodology, concludes that "one cannot help being struck 
by the lack of methodological sophistication... displayed" by 
Friedman and the debate he spawned.^^ Posner concentrates on 
probably the most controversial part of Friedman's essay—his 
peculiar insistence on the unrealistic nature of the assumptions 
underlying scientific theory.^^ 
1. Instrumentalism 
Friedman's methodology is supposed to combine falsification 
and instrumentalism.^^ Instrumentalism is the position that a theory 
Id. 
18 See MARK BLAUG, THE METHODOLOGY OF ECONOMICS, OR HOW ECONOMISTS 
EXPLAIN (2d ed. 1992) for an excellent introduction to the controversy about economic 
methodology generally, including about Friedman's article specifically. 
19 See discussion infra Part I.B.4. 
20 Blaug suggests that, in context, it is not absolutely clear whether Friedman intended 
these consequences suggested by Friedman's idiosyncratic language. See infra notes 106-13 
and accompanying text. 
21 BLAUG, supra note 18, at 104. 
22 Posner does admit in at least one place that, although the assumptions underlying a 
theory must necessarily be imrealistic, it might also be possible for assumptions to be 
insufficiently realistic. See POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 16, at 18. 
23 Herbert Hovenkamp suggests, however, that instrumentalism may be, in fact, 
antithetical to strict falsification. According to Hovenkamp, the instrumentalist believes: 
Once someone has formulated a theory, it is not especially important to attempt 
to falsify it aggressively. Rather, one should simply consider how reliably the 
theory produces correct answers to a particular question that the researcher 
wishes to ask. For example, Newtonian physics is perfectly good for the 
engineer building bridges or the field commander shooting artillery, even though 
the theory has been falsified by experiments with relativity and might not be the 
best theory for someone planning an expedition to Mars. 
Herbert Hovenkamp, Positivism in Law & Economics, 78 CAL. L. REV. 815, 832 (1990). I 
basically agree with Hovenkamp's statement but, as I discuss below, I believe that his 
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is purely a tool for a specific purpose. In Friedman and Posner's 
case, theory is primarily a tool for prediction.'" It is frequently 
contrasted with "descriptivism"—the view that a scientific theory 
should accurately describe reality.'' InstrumentaUsm should also be 
contrasted with the use of theory to explain or understand a 
phenomenon. Because the standard of vahdity under 
instrumentalism is whether or not a theory serves its purpose, 
instrumentalism is agnostic with respect to the truth value of its own 
propositions. 
Instrumentalism is consistent with, but does not require, a 
radical nominalism. Opinions among scientists as to the 
epistemological status of science vary widely. To mention two 
extreme positions, Stephen Hawking is a self-proclaimed positivist 
who believes that physical theories are just mathematical models we 
construct, and that it is meaningless to ask if they correspond to 
reality, just whether they predict observations.'"^ In contrast, Roger 
Penrose, Hawking's frequent collaborator, is a self-described 
Neoplatonist who believes that mathematical theory is the true 
reality, which the object world only unperfectly reflects. As David 
Luban has argued before me, Posner seems to be internally 
inconsistent with respect to the truth claims of theory.'« On the one 
hand, as I shall explore in this Article, in his argument that 
prediction is the only criterion of a theory's validity, Posner 
frequently suggests that the hteral truth of a theory is either 
unknowable, irrelevant, or nonexistent. On the other hand, a 
complete dismissal of truth claims is hard to reconcile with the basic 
tenants of falsification, which by positing that hypotheses can be 
description of how engineers treat scientific theory is not qnite correct. See infra text 
accompanying notes 129-54. ...... i u 
24 See BLAUG, supra note 18, at 91. Posner does, from time to time, admit that the law has 
other purposes. For example, in Economic Analysis of Law, he mentions explanation and 
intervention in the world as plausible purposes. See POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra 
note 16, at 18-19. In context, however, it seems that Posner's conceptions of explanation and 
intervention are closely related, if not totally subsumed, into the broader concept of 
prediction. By explanation he seems to mean: if x occurs then y (i.e., we can predict y from x). 
Intervention seems to mean the recommendation that someone do x because if she does, then 
y will occur. 
25 See BLAUG, supra note 18, at 98-99; see also Posner, Behavioral Economics, supra note 
6, at 1560 (distinguishing "between a description and a theory"). 
26 Stephen Hawking, The Objections of an Unashamed Reductionist, m THE LARGE, THE 
SMALL AND THE HUMAN MIND 169 (Malcolm Longair ed., 1997). 
27 See ROGER PENROSE, SHADOWS OF THE MIND: A SEARCH FOR THE MISSING 
SCIENCE OF CONSCIOUSNESS 50-51 (1994); Roger Penrose, Space-time in Cosmology, in THE 
LARGE, THE SMALL AND THE HUMAN MIND IWPRA note 26, at 1-4. 
28 See David Luban, The Posner Variations (Twenty-Seven Variations on a Theme by 
Holmes), 48 STAN. L. REV. 1001,1011-12 (1996). 
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proven to be false implies by negative pregnant that some form of 
truth is out there, even if we can only indirectly know it. 
Karl Popper, probably the foremost proponent of falsification 
as scientific methodology, tries to sail a middle passage between 
nominalism and realism.^' Working within a tradition that reaches at 
least as far back as Kant, Popper argues that humans can never have 
direct knowledge of the object world (which he calls world 1),^° 
because experience is always mediated through thoughts and 
images.^^ Nevertheless, humans are not limited to their own 
subjective interpretations (world 2).^^ We can come to an 
intersubjective consensus (world 3) about the object world through 
the application of an agreed upon methodology." Moreover, Popper 
29 As I have elsewhere laboriously stretched a classical allusion with respect to Popper, 
"To navigate between the Scylla of individualistic solipsism and the Charybdis of false 
universals, objectivity is defined as the Odysseus of intersubjective agreement." Jeanne L. 
Schroeder, Subject: Object, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1,17 (1992) [hereinafter Schroeder, Subject-
Object]. 
30 The first world is "the world of physical objects or of physical states." KARL R. 
POPPER, OBJECTIVE KNOWLEDGE; AN EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH 106 (1972) [hereinafter 
POPPER, OBJECTIVE KNOWLEDGE]. 
31 The second world is "the world of states of consciousness, or of mental states, or 
perhaps behavioural dispositions to act." Id. at 106. Popper emphasizes the importance of the 
second world: "The first world and the third world cannot interact save through the 
intervention of the second world, the world of subjective or personal experiences." Id. at 155. 
32 See id. at 107. Popper states: 
Most opponents of the thesis of an objective third world will... usually say that 
all these entities [i.e., problems, conjectures, theories, arguments, journals, and 
books] are, essentially, symbolic or linguistic expressions of subjective mental 
states, or perhaps of behavioural dispositions to act;... that is to say, symbolic 
or linguistic means to evoke in others similar mental states or behavioural 
dispositions to act. 
Against this, I have often argued that one cannot relegate all these entities 
and their content to the second world. 
Id. Popper believes, rather, in an "independent existence of the third world" Id. He 
continues: "It seems to me most important to describe and explain the relationship of the 
three worlds in this way—that is, with the second world as the mediator between the first and 
third.... [T]he mind may be linked with objects of both the first world and the third world." 
Id. at 156. 
33 Popper follows Kant: 
[T]he word "objective" [is used] to indicate that scientific knowledge should be 
justifiable, independently of anybody's whim: a justification is "objective" if in 
principle it can be tested and understood by anybody. "If something is 'valid', 
[Kant] writes, "for anybody in possession of his reason, then its grounds are 
objective and sufficient." 
Now I hold that scientific theories are never fully justifiable or verifiable, 
but that they are nevertheless testable. I shall therefore say that the objectivity 
of scientific statements lies in the fact that they can be inter-subjectively tested." 
KARL R. POPPER, THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIHC DISCOVERY 44 (1968) [hereinafter POPPER, 
SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY] (citation omitted); see also POPPER, OBJECTIVE KNOWLEDGE, 
supra note 30, at 106-08,152-75; Jeanne L. Schroeder, Abduction from the Seraglio: Feminist 
Methodologies and the Logic of Imagination, 70 TEX. L. REV. 109,161-64 (1991) [hereinafter 
Schroeder, Abduction]-, Schroeder, Subject: Object, supra note 29, at 17-29. Although Popper 
ranted against Hegel in his book. The Open Society and Its Enemies, his theory of the three 
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claims that the methodology of falsification eliminates hypotheses 
that are inconsistent with world 1 (the object world). As a result, 
world 3 (our intersubjective consensus) will over time move further 
from world 2 (our subjective opinions) and closer to world 1 (the 
object world).^'* Consequently, Jiirgen Habermas has characterized 
the philosophy of science since Charles Sanders Peirce as being 
concerned with "a method of arriving at uncompelled and 
permanent consensus,"^' as opposed to knowledge of existence per 
se. That is, in Popperian science "methodology replaces ontology 
and epistemology."^® I shall return to Popper in the last section of 
this Article, although a complete discussion of the metaphysical 
implications of economic theory is necessarily beyond the scope of 
this Article. 
Both Posner and Friedman claim to adopt a definition of 
rationality as instrumental, or ends-means, reasoning.^' Such a 
definition of rationahty is neither logically required by an 
instrumentalist methodology, nor is it inconsistent with a 
descriptivist one. Nevertheless, it is perhaps not surprising that the 
concept of rationality as instrumental thinking would appeal to the 
same type of people who are drawn to an instrumentalist 
methodology. Indeed, I suspect that by implicitly conflating the term 
of art "economic rationality" with the colloquial connotations of 
worlds resembles a simplistic version of Hegelian idealism. Notoriously, Popper seems never 
to have read Hegel but relied on a book of excerpts and inaccurate second-hand descriptions 
by critics of Hegel. See K.R. POPPER, THE OPEN SOCIETY AND ITS ENEMIES (1966). 
34 See Schroeder, Abduction, supra note 33, at 162-64. Popper believes that the third 
world, although by necessity a human creation, is nevertheless objective and autonomous of 
human consciousness: 
The world of language, of conjectures, theories, and arguments—in brief, 
the universe of objective knowledge—is one of the most important of these man-
created yet at the same time largely autonomous, universes. 
The autonomy of the third world, and the feed-back of the third world upon 
the second and even the first, are among the most important facts of the growth 
of knowledge. 
With the evolution of the argumentative function of language, criticism 
becomes the main instrument of further growth. 
Our work is fallible, like all human work. We constantly make mistakes, 
and there are objective standards of which we may fall short—standards of truth, 
of content, of validity, and other standards. 
. . .  S c i e n t i s t s  t r y  t o  e l i m i n a t e  t h e i r  f a l s e  t h e o r i e s ,  t h e y  t r y  t o  l e t  t h e m  d i e  i n  
their stead. 
POPPER, OBJECTIVE KNOWLEDGE, supra note 30, at 118,119,121,122. 
35 JfjRGEN HABERMAS, KNOWLEDGE AND HUMAN INTERESTS 91 (Jeremy J. Shapiro 
trans., 1969). 
36 Schroeder, Subject: Object, supra note 29, at 18. 
37 I discuss this extensively in Schroeder, Economic Rationality, supra note 8. 
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rationality as "sane" or "reasonable"—i.e., rationality is posited not 
merely as a name for how people hypothetically do act, but as a 
prescription for or definition of how sane people should act'®—the 
proponents might be led to assume that instrumentahsm is the only 
"reasonable" method. That is, if sane people act instrumentally, 
then theory is only meaningful if it can be used as an instrument. 
This is a non sequitur. 
2. Description 
According to Friedman, "[t]he ultimate goal of a positive 
science is the development of a 'theory' or 'hypothesis' that yields 
valid and meaningful (i.e., not truistic) predictions about phenomena 
not yet observed."" A theory has two elements: "In part, it is a 
'language' designed to promote 'systematic and organized methods 
of reasoning.' In part it is a body of substantive hypotheses designed 
to abstract essential features of complex reality.""" That is, the 
primary goal of science is prediction. Moreover, the only relevant 
test of a theory is falsification: 
The hypothesis is rejected if its predictions are contradicted 
("frequently" or more often than predictions from an 
alternative hypothesis); it is accepted if its predictions are not 
contradicted; great confidence is attached to it if it has survived 
many opportunities for contradiction. Factual evidence can 
never "prove" a hypothesis; it can only fail to disprove it, which 
is what we generally mean when we say, somewhat inexactly, 
that the hypothesis has been "confirmed" by experience."^ 
Friedman concludes from this that it is not a criticism of a theory to 
say that its assumptions are unrealistic. This is so not only because 
the realism, or lack thereof, of assumptions is irrelevant to the 
validity of a theory."' Rather, Friedman goes further and maintains 
that "[t]o be important... a hypothesis must be descriptively false in 
its assumptions.""' In other words, Friedman can be interpreted to 
assert that falsity of assumptions is an affirmatively good thing. 
As I shall discuss in greater detail below, Friedman's defenders 
suggest that, in the immediate context in which these statements are 
made, Friedman can be read as equating "realism" with a 
photographic reproduction of all concrete details of a phenomenon 
38 See id. 
39 FRIEDMAN, supra note 12, at 7. 
40 Id. (citation omitted). 
41 Id. at 9. 
42 Friedman asserts that the "widely held view" that "the conformity of... 'assumptions' 
to 'reality' is a test of the validity of the hypothesis" is "fundamentally wrong and productive 
of much mischief." Id. at 14. 
43 Id. 
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and "unrealism" with abstraction. For example, at one point he 
states: "A hypothesis is important if it "explains" much by little, that 
is, if it abstracts the common and crucial elements from the mass of 
complex and detailed circumstances surrounding the phenomena to 
be explained and permits valid predictions on the basis of them 
alone.'"" 
Friedman also concludes that "the relevant question to ask 
about... 'assumptions'... [is] whether they are sufficiently good 
approximations for the purpose in hand" which is good 
prediction."' If all Friedman had intended to say—albeit in 
idiosyncratic and potentially misleading language was that 
abstraction is a necessary part of any analytical process, then his 
essay would never have caused such a sensation. 
The controversy arises because other statements made by 
Friedman suggest that he takes a giant step beyond this relatively 
uncontroversial view of abstraction and asserts that the assumptions 
behind a theory have no necessary relationship to "truth" per se. He 
does not merely identify realism with concreteness and umealism 
with abstraction, he suggests further that he might accept as scientific 
a theory based on assumptions that are either demonstrably false or 
outright fantastic. That is, he sometimes seems to use the word 
"unreal" in the colloquial sense of "nonreal" or false. Consequently, 
Friedman suggests that neoclassical theory need not posit that 
economic subjects are actually economically rational, or even that 
they in fact tend to act as if they were economically rational, but that 
one can make good economic predictions if one assumes that 
economic subjects act as if they were economically rational, whether 
or not they actually are or so act."' This interpretation is the F-twist. 
3. Explanation 
Despite Friedman's assertion, not all scientists, or all 
economists, accept the proposition that theory is primarily 
instrumental in nature. Although Samuelson, like Friedman, tries to 
avoid the inevitable epistemological and metaphysical implications 
of what it might mean to have knowledge of the object world, he 
does insist that the point of science is precisely to describe the 
universe."^ Samuelson is an unrepentant descriptivist who asserts 
that it "is fundamentally wrong [to think] that umealism in the sense 
of factual inaccuracy even to a tolerable degree of approximation is 
44 Id. 
45 Id. at 15. 
46 See infra text accompanying notes 154-58. 
47 See infra text accompanying notes 74-85. 
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anything but a demerit for a theory or hypothesis 
Accordingly, he calls Friedman's methodology "a monstrous 
perversion of science.""' 
Samuelson may go too far: many philosophers of science find 
pure descriptivism to be as naive and as objectionable as pure 
instrumentalism. Indeed, descriptivism has been described as a 
"poor man's version of instrumentalism."'" 
Herbert Hovenkamp offers a more modest, but well-taken 
criticism of instrumentalism—^at least as it is practiced in law and 
economics: 
An important consequence of instrumentalism is to place strict 
limits on the domain of any particular hypothesis. A hypothesis 
that has survived testing in a particular context might fare 
poorly when used elsewhere. Statements within a given 
economic model are deemed "true" because that model yields 
better predictions with respect to a certain question than does 
some alternative model. When the question changes, the model 
must be reexamined by empirical testing and comparison with 
alternative hypotheses.'^ 
By the very logic of instrumentalism, then, one carmot conclude 
from the observation that a set of "assumptions" results in accurate 
predictions in one context that the same set of "assumptions" wiU 
also be a good predictor in another context. This conclusion is, in 
fact, a new hypothesis that needs to be separately falsified—to 
accept it as something more is to confuse a new prediction with an 
assumption. 
Although Simon, the father of behavioral economics, agrees 
with Friedman in the sense that he thinks that economic theory 
should serve an instrumental purpose, he sharply distinguishes his 
own methodology from Friedman's. Simon beheves that good 
prediction only flows from the understanding that accurate 
description brings. That is, according to Simon, if "we want [an] 
economic theor[y]... to help guide the actual management and 
operation of firms,"'^ then: 
[I]t must be a theory that describes [the operations of firms] 
realistically, not an "as if" theory. In both its descriptive and its 
normative aspects, it must describe, and prescribe for, the 
decision making processes of managers with close attention to 
48 2 PAUL A. SAMUELSON, THE COLLECTED SCIENTIFIC PAPERS OF PAUL A. 
SAMUELSON 1774 (I.E. Stiglitz ed., 1966), quoted in BLAUG, supra note 18, at 97. 
49 Id. 
50 BLAUG, supra note 18, at 99 (citations omitted). 
51 Hovenkamp, supra note 23, at 827. 
52 HERBERT A. SIMON, AN EMPIRICALLY BASED MICROECONOMICS 62 (1997) 
[hereinafter SIMON, MICROECONOMICS]. 
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the kinds of knowledge that are attainable and the kinds of 
computations that can actually be carried out." 
As we shall see, despite some vociferous language, it is not clear 
whether Friedman—or Posner for that matter—is quite the pure 
instrumentalist and antidescriptivist he claims to be. 
As I mentioned briefly in the introduction and develop at length 
elsewhere,'" whatever the goals of scientific theory, instrumentalism 
and prediction should not be the only test of legal analysis. Indeed, a 
fundamental difference in goals is one of the reasons why law-and-
economics scholars and their critics consistently fail to communicate. 
Law and economics is a policy science—it seeks to give advice to 
legislators, judges, or others in power regarding what the law should 
be in order to achieve certain societal objectives. As such it must 
both identify what these goals should be (such as pareto optimality 
or wealth maximization) and predict how legal and economic 
subjects will respond to incentives or disincentives created by the 
law. In other words, the policy scientist seeks to use law to 
manipulate the behavior of those who are subject to its power. 
There is nothing wrong about this per se—it is the very nature of 
legal policy making. 
ITie speculative theorist or critical legal scholar, in contrast, 
seeks not so much to give advice to the government, but to 
understand the position of the governed—those who are subjected 
to the law. The critical position is not that of the legislator or the 
judge, but of the attorney who counsels and represents clients. By 
understanding how the law affects her and her client, the lawyer and 
critical scholar can seek better to integrate the individual legal 
subject within the legal system—whether with other legal subjects 
through contract, or with the government through compliance. 
Through understanding, she seeks to free the legal subject from 
manipulation by the law. The legal subject who understands the law 
can now either freely submit to the law, seek to manipulate the law 
for her own individualistic and subjective goals, or seek to change 
the law. In the terms of Lacanian discourse theory, the critical 
scholar speaks a discourse of the Hysteric, whereas the legal 
economist speaks a discourse of the University." In the former, one 
stands in the position of the person subjected to the law who 
addresses the law itself. In the latter, one stands in the position of 
the legal expert who addresses the instrumental purpose of the law. 
As neither addresses the other directly, communication fails. 
Consequently, the critical scholar who says, in effect, "look what the 
53 Id. at 63. 
54 See sources cited supra note 10. 
55 I explain this analysis in Schroeder, The Four Discourses, supra note 10. 
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law is doing to me" is never effectively heard by the pohcy scientist 
who can only respond "this is the purpose of the law." For 
communication to occur, one of the two parties must step out of her 
own discourse and engage in a linking discourse. Lacan called this 
third discourse, the discourse of the Analyst. 
There are many different types of "explanation" in science and 
elsewhere. Philosopher of science Ernest Nagel gives ten examples 
of different types of scientific explanation, which he then groups into 
four categories: (1) the deductive model; (2) probabihstic 
explanations; (3) functional or teleological explanations; and (4) 
genetic explanations.^® At first blush, the Friedman-Posner 
methodology would seem to fall within the first, deductive model, 
which is commonly used in the natural sciences. This type of 
explanation "has the formal structure of a deductive argument, in 
which the explicandum is a logically necessary consequence of the 
explanatory premises."" 
Upon closer examination, however, it is apparent that Friedman 
and Posner's view of science inverts the deductive explanation. A 
deductive explanation would posit that rational behavior by 
economic subjects would result in a downward-sloping demand 
curve; therefore, the reason the demand curve slopes downward is 
because economic subjects are rational. That is, economists would 
initially observe the surprising fact of downward-sloping demand 
curves and abduct the hypothesis that this could be explained if 
economic subjects behaved in a certain way (i.e., were economically 
"rational"). Economists would then test this hypothesis by 
structuring controlled observations of economic subjects to see if 
they in fact acted rationally. If they did not (i.e., if the hypothesis is 
not falsified) then one has reason to continue to accept the 
hypothesis. 
In contrast, Friedman and Posner can be read as saying that, if 
we assume that economic subjects act "as if" they were rational, then 
we would predict that demand curves would slope downward. This 
hypothesis would be tested by engaging in controlled observation of 
demand curves to see if one could observe any that were upward 
sloping. Theirs is, however, a "theory" that in fact predicts nothing. 
It is merely a post hoc explanation of a phenomenon already 
observed, namely downward-sloping demand curves. Moreover, as 
56 See ERNEST NAGEL, THE STRUCTURE OF SQENCE: PROBLEMS IN THE IX)GIC OF 
SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION 21-26 (2d ed. 1979). 
57 Id. at 21. Nagel points out that this "has been widely regarded as the paradigm for any 
'genuine' explanation and, has often been adopted as the ideal form." Id. Nevertheless, even 
in the natural sciences this ideal is often impossible in practice: "[F]ew if any experimental 
scientists today believe that their explicanda can be shown to be inherently necessary." Id. 
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formulated by Friedman and Posner, this theory does not even 
suggest "why" demand curves slope downward because it does not 
purport to tell us how economic actors really think or act. As we 
shah see, it only suggests that downward-sloping demand curves are 
consistent with the hypothesis that economic actors act "as if' they 
were rational.^® But, as Gary Becker among others has suggested, 
downward-sloping demand curves are equally consistent with certain 
types of nonrational behavior.'' Consequently, Friedman and 
Posner's methodology gives no way to choose between rival 
"explanations"—other than aesthetics.®" As I discuss below,®i 
although Friedman and Posner claim to be scientific, from the 
perspective of the Popperian school of falsification this may, in fact, 
be an unscientific way of moving from hypothesis formation to 
"proof." 
B. The Role of Assumptions and the Unreality Principle 
1. Unrealistic Assumptions: Abstract or False? 
Friedman (and Posner) claim both that theories are predictive, 
rather than descriptive, and that, therefore, theoretical assumptions 
are necessarily unrealistic.®^ This claim, however, depends upon 
questionable definitions that conflate description with both reahsm 
and a perfect reproduction of all the details of an empirical 
phenomenon. 
There is more than one way to interpret Friedman and Posner. 
When they say that theories are not accurate descriptions they might 
just be using very odd language to make the well-recognized 
distinction between the abstract and concrete.®' For example, when 
Posner speaks of the lack of realism of theories, he cites the failure 
of theories to "capture the full complexity, richness, and confusion of 
the phenomena[,]"®'' and refers to realism as "descriptive 
completeness."®' As I have already mentioned in passing, if this 
were all that they meant, then Posner and Friedman would be 
relatively noncontroversial. I shall return to this.®® 
Friedman and Posner would also be relatively noncontroversial 
if they were interpreted as merely describing Poppperian 
58 See infra text accompanying notes 154-58. 
59 See infra text accompanying notes 260-63. 
60 See infra text accompanying notes 127-28. 
61 See discussion infra Part II.C. 
62 See supra text accompanying notes 39-43. 
63 See discussion infra Part I.B.3. 
64 POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 16, at 18. 
65 Id. 
66 See discussion infra Part I.B.4. 
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falsification, albeit in a particularly idiosyncratic vocabulary. 
Friedman's assertion that the realism of assumptions is irrelevant 
and that theories are only tested by predictive power, could be 
merely another way of making the Popperian point that under 
falsification one does not test the theory directly through verification 
(i.e., in Friedman's terms, by testing the "reality" of the 
assumptions). One can and should, however, test the theory 
indirectly or negatively by testing the implications of the theory (by 
trying to observe data inconsistent with the theory).®^ In other 
words, verification is unacceptable, but falsification is acceptable. 
As I discuss below, Friedman and Posner's language, however, 
suggests that they go further and divorce theoretical assumptions 
from any truth claims whatsoever.®^ That is, they might be taking the 
F-twist: equating "unreal" with "untrue" (or at least with the 
proposition that the literal truth of assumptions is irrelevant to the 
validity of a theory). In which case, Friedman and Posner seem to 
invite us to accept a theory as scientific, even when we know that it is 
false, merely because it is useful for some purposes. 
For example, Blaug characterizes Friedman as asserting that 
"not only is it unnecessary for assumptions to be realistic, it is a 
positive advantage if they are not: 'to be important... a hypothesis 
must be descriptively false in its assumptions.'"®' Similarly, Posner 
says that "lack of realism" is a "precondition of theory."™ It is 
unclear precisely what they mean by this. One can argue that the 
logical implication of some of Friedman's statements is that one can 
ignore the empirical truth value of scientific theories so long as one 
can use them as predictors.''^ That is, Friedman seems to suggest that 
he would still adhere to a theory that is based on assumptions that 
have been shown to be false if it could be used as a predictor.™ This 
F-twist is different than the positivism of Hawking, which holds that 
it is meaningless to ask whether mathematical models correspond to 
some unknowable external reality," in that it suggests that we should 
retain a theory even when it can be shown that it does not in fact 
67 See infra Part II.B (discussing Popperian falsification). 
68 See infra Part I.C.3. 
69 BLAUG, supra note 18, at 91 (quoting FLTIEDMAN, supra note 12, at 14). 
70 POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 16, at 18. 
71 In Amartya Sen's words: "Milton Friedman... in particular, has argued powerfully in 
favour of departing from truth in describing reality in the context of economic models " 
AMARTYA SEN, CHOICE, WELFARE AND MEASUREMENT 434 (1982). 
72 See BLAUG, supra note 18, at 97 ("According to Samuelson, the E-twist comes in two 
versions:... [the] extreme version... ascribes positive merit to unrealistic assumptions on the 
grounds that a significant theory will always account for complex reality by something simpler 
than itself."). 
73 See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
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match up with the empirical world. Let us stop and examine these 
arguments in more detail. I shall return to the F-twist below. 
2. Descriptivism and Instrumentalism 
Despite Friedman and Posner's dismissal of descriptivism, and 
despite Samuelson's agreement that his methodology of 
descriptivism is indeed distinguishable from instrumentalism, many 
economists have concluded that in practice there is no material 
difference between the two approaches. As Amartya Sen has 
pointed out, part of the reason that theorists like Friedman and 
Posner reject descriptivism is that they seem to have an extremely 
odd notion of what description is. They implicitly assume that 
description is a passive activity of observing and reporting everything 
that one sees, sparing no detail.''* For example, Friedman and 
Posner claim that a description of a phenomenon is a reproduction, 
not an explanation." This is, in fact, what Popper condemns as the 
naive bucket view of observation, which conceptualizes the observer 
as a passive receptacle of data." 
In contrast, as Sen points out, a good description requires the 
"choice of a subset from a set of possible statements."" Some 
perfectly accurate statements about a phenomenon can be 
"unhelpful, even useless."" Consequently, the describer must first 
identify the purpose of the description. In Popper's terminology, the 
scientific observer is a searchlight that actively singles out specific 
details for examination." In other words, observation and 
description are themselves forms of abstraction. 
By asserting that the sole purpose of scientific theory is 
prediction, Friedman and Posner seem to ignore the possibility that 
many details that could be included in a description might be 
irrelevant or harmful for one purpose, although these details might 
serve some other valid scientific purpose: "Description may well be 
geared to some objective other than prediction, e.g., normative 
analysis, or efficient communication, or even satisfying idle 
curiosity."^" In other words, one might describe the same 
74 See SEN, supra note 71, at 433. 
75 In Posner's words: "A theory that sought faithfully to reproduce the complexity of the 
empirical world in its assumptions would not be a theory—an explanation—but a 
description." PoSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 16, at 18. 
76 See infra note 210. 
77 SEN, SUPRA note 71, at 447. 
78 Id. at 433. Sen gives the example of an expert answering a question about factory wages 
in India with the answer, "It varies from place to place." Id. 
79 See infra note 210. 
80 NAGEL, supra note 56, at 439. 
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phenomenon differently depending on one's purpose, and yet each 
description might be "true" within the standards of its purpose. 
Once one identifies a purpose, one then needs to choose what 
aspects of the phenomenon to be described are relevant to that 
purpose. For example, Friedman offers the specious argument that a 
"reahstic" description of a businessman would include his eye and 
hair color and various other personal characteristics that a proper 
economic model ignores.®' Sen replies: 
In assessing this objection it is necessary to consider the 
distinction between realism in the sense of "nothing but the 
truth" and that in the sense of "the whole truth." An 
assumption can be realistic in that it is true without the claim 
being made that it is exhaustive in capturing all aspects of the 
reality. Advocates of realism in the sense of "nothing but the 
truth" need not demand "the whole truth."®^ 
A good explanation is one that first determines the purpose of the 
description in the sense of what question is being asked; second, 
determines what facts about the phenomena to be described are 
relevant to that question; and third, abstracts these elements from 
the concrete examples of the phenomena actually observed. This 
type of description is arguably indistinguishable from falsification. 
This seems to be the type of description that Samuelson has in mind. 
As I discuss in Economic Rationality,^^ Samuelson's model of 
economic rationality—revealed preference theory or "RPT"—is 
perhaps even more abstract than Friedman's in that it claims to 
eliminate utihty (and therefore ends-means reasoning) entirely. 
As Sen says of both Friedman and Samuelson's approach: 
"[Djespite some predictive merits [it is] remarkably mute about 
human joys and sufferings in which economists used to take a lot of 
interest. The result is a descriptive impoverishment from many 
perspectives, including—among others—normative relevance "®'' 
I would argue that this critique is even stronger with respect to 
Posner than Friedman, since Posner purports to apply economic 
analysis to a wide variety of subjects having great normative import, 
such as human sexuality and family relations. 
In Sen's words: 
Predicting future choice on the basis of past choice is not in 
itself a bad predictive strategy (despite some well-known 
problems). But if that is used as the only focus of the theory of 
utility, then there is either silence on many important issues 
81 See SEN, supra note 71, at 437-38. 
82 Id. at 438. 
83 See Schroeder, Economic Rationality, supra note 8. 
84 SEN, supra note 71, at 442. 
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(when "utility" is treated as just another name for a numerical 
reflector of choice), or there is a good deal of senseless noise.^^ 
3. Abstraction 
As I have suggested, one could argue that Friedman's 
realistic/unrealistic dichotomy might merely be intended to reflect 
the concrete/abstract distinction. Posner sometimes makes this 
identification expressly. For example, in a paragraph arguing for the 
unreality of theories he states that "abstraction is of the essence of 
scientific inquiry."®^ In Blaug's words: 
The assumptions of economic theory are sometimes said to be 
"unrealistic" in the sense of being abstract [T]his is 
certainly one of Friedman's meanings: "realistic" assumptions 
are descriptively accurate in the sense that they take account of 
all the relevant background variables and refuse to leave any of 
them out.^' 
Martha Nussbaum makes a similar point: "Milton Friedman long 
ago correctly argued that positive economics, like other sciences, can 
and should use simple assumptions that do not in all respects 
correspond to the complex phenomenology of real human action."®^ 
It is a very different thing, however, to assert that an "abstract" 
description is less "realistic" than a "concrete" one. The very nature 
of abstraction arguably implies some type of truth-statement about 
the class of things being abstracted. That is, when one abstracts 
something, one is not asserting that one has identified all 
characteristies of the thing described, but that one has identified 
those shared characteristics of a class of objects that are relevant for 
the purposes at hand. Such description implicitly claims to be "real" 
in the sense that it identifies the true essence of a phenomenon by 
wirmowing away extraneous detail.®' That is, the fact that models are 
not "the whole truth" does not necessarily mean that they are not 
"the truth... and nothing but the truth." Consequently, Nussbaum 
declares: "What is at issue is the question whether the assumptions 
85 Id. 
86 POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 16, at 18. 
87 BLAUG, supra note 18, at 92. 
88 Martha C. Nussbaum, Flawed Foundations: The Philosophical Critique of (a Particular 
Type of) Economics, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1197,1201 (1997). 
89 As Gary Lawson says: "It may seem so obvious that a normative model cannot 
properly make use of incoherent or empty concepts. To evaluate actions by reference to 
an incoherent or nonexistent standard borders on a definition of psychosis." Gary Lawson, 
Efficiency and Individualism, 42 DUKE L.J. 53,76 (1992). Nevertheless, Lawson suggests that 
one might carefully use empty concepts for limited purposes. For exeunple, one might use a 
model as a proxy for a true moral theory, if one thought that the model led to relatively 
accurate predictions and was easier to apply. See id. at 76-77. Lawson generously interprets 
Posner as taking this relatively modest approach. See id. at 77. 
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are too crude, so oversimple that they fail to single out those aspects 
of the world that are most salient for predictive purposes.'"" 
Although Nagel does not refer to Friedman directly, he seems 
to have Friedman implicitly in mind in his discussioii of certain 
methodological problems encountered in economics. One 
difference between practitioners of the "natural" sciences and most 
social scientists is that the former try to develop universal laws, while 
the latter tend to make statistical generalizations.'^ Some social 
scientists, most notably economists,'^ have sought to develop a 
methodology to make their fields more like the natural sciences. 
This requires an understanding of the nature of scientific laws—a 
goal that the Friedman article approaches but does not attain. 
In Nagel's words: 
[T]he terms used in the universal laws of many branches of 
science usually have a quite precise connotation, and frequently 
signify traits that are more or less "idealized" versions of 
actually observed properties. Each such term is in consequence 
intended to designate some class of items that are highly 
homogeneous in certain indicated respects; and a law 
containing such terms is neither expected to be, nor is it 
actually, in strict agreement with observed data " 
That is, although scientific laws require simplified, abstracted 
concepts, these concepts are nevertheless intended to be true, at 
least in the sense of accurate, in that they capture certain shared 
characteristics of the class of things being studied. The scientist 
simplifies and idealizes in order to identify the essential aspects of 
the class of things that is relevant to the task at hand: "[U]niversal 
laws formulated in terms of distinctions more subtle than is 
necessary for achieving the objectives of empirical research, may be 
just so much dead lumber. A high-powered microscope is not an 
improvement on a simple magnifying glass as an instrument for 
reading small print.'"" 
Consequently, when neoclassical economics starts from an 
assumption that economic actors are "rational," this does not 
necessarily imply that humans are economically rational at all times, 
or in all circumstances. It could merely mean that economic 
rationality is one "true" moment that can be abstracted from human 
nature. There could be other equally "true" moments. To suggest 
that there might be an economically irrational as well as an 
economically rational moment does not necessarily imply that 
90 Nussbaum, supra note 88, at 1201. 
91 See NAGEL, supra note 56, at 503-05. 
92 See id. at 508-09. 
93 Mat505. 
94 Id. at 508. 
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human behavior is unpredictable, as Posner assumes.'^ It might be 
possible to develop a predictive theory of when one aspect of human 
nature might be expected to prevail and when other aspects might. 
This is, in fact, the approach of many philosophical systems, most 
notably Hegelian philosophy and Lacanian psychoanalysis, which I 
discuss at length elsewhere.'^ 
If one were to take such an approach, then Friedman would be 
correct in saying that testing for market behavior predicted by the 
assumption of economic rationality may not necessarily have any 
imphcations for the truth of the assumption that human beings are 
essentially economically rational for all purposes. Indeed, despite 
Posner's assertion of the possible unreality of the rationality 
assumption, the very thing many of Posner's critics (such as myself) 
find most objectionable about his theory is precisely that he 
imphcitly concludes from evidence that the rationality postulate is an 
accurate predictor of some market behavior, that the rationality 
postulate is a vahd description of human nature and a predictor of 
behavior in other areas. Probably the most notorious example of 
this is Posner's analysis of htunan sexuahty. In Nussbaum's words: 
"Posner's descriptions of human sexuality, in Sex and Reason, do not 
convey the sense that we are looking at sex the way people generally 
look at it; instead, a perspective of lofty detachment has flattened 
and simplified things that are usually messy and real."" As I shall 
discuss,'^ despite his claims, Posner usually uses his theory to explain 
aheady observed data, rather than predicting unobserved data. 
Moreover, when he does make predictions he engages in the easy 
but unrehable methodology of verification—predicting data that 
would be consistent his hypothesis—rather than the more 
difficult and reliable one of falsification—predicting data that would 
be inconsistent with his hypothesis. In any event, despite his call for 
lawyers and judges to make empirically based decisions," Posner 
does not in fact do the observational work that would either verify or 
falsify his hypotheses. 
The problem of overbreadth that I identify in Posner is 
precisely one of the dangers that concerned Friedman. Nevertheless, 
95 See Posner, Behavioral Economics, supra note 6, at 1559 ("The rational-choice 
economist asks what 'rational man' would do in a given situation, and usually the answer is 
pretty clear But it is profoundly unclear what 'behavioral man' would do in any given 
situation.... He might do anything."); id. at 1575 ("Behavioral man behaves in unpredictable 
ways."). 
96 See Schroeder, Economic Rationality, supra note 8; Schroeder, Fear of Freedom, supra 
note 9. 
97 Nussbaum, supra note 88, at 1200. 
98 See infra notes 273-89 and accompanying text. 
99 See, e.g., POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW, supra note 5, at 5-8. 
372 CARDOZO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22:351 
although Friedman resists, one could certainly conclude that, despite 
the fact that the predictions of the rationality postulate have not 
been falsified in certain specific circumstances, there exists at least 
some evidence that the rationality postulate has something "true" to 
say about actual human behavior in these circumstances. In Nagel's 
words: "[I]t is possible in many branches of natural science to state 
laws as universally valid under certain 'ideal' conditions and for 
'pure cases' of the phenomena investigated 
What critics such as Samuelson and myself object to in 
Friedman and Posner is that they arguably leap fiom an appropriate 
rejection of the standard of "the whole truth," to a rejection of 
"nothing but the truth," to a rejection of realism entirely, which 
comes very close to holding not merely that truth is not a necessary 
condition of a scientific theory, but that fiction has a positive value in 
a theory. 
That is, Friedman argues not only that accuracy of prediction is 
the only test of the validity of a hypothesis, but also that the 
conformity of the underlying "assumptions" of the hypothesis to 
reality is not an additional test of the hypothesis.Friedman's critics 
have accused him of asserting that the validity of a theory has 
nothing to do with the vahdity of the underlying assumptions (so that 
one cannot prove a theory valid by proving the assumptions, and the 
fact that a theory is a good predictor does not imply that its 
underlying assumptions are true). It is now time to turn to the 
interpretation of Friedman's theory that Samuelson calls the "F-
twist,"'® and Simon calls the "unreality principle."^"^ 
4. Defending Friedman Against the F-twist Accusation 
What does Posner mean when he states that the validity of 
economic theory is not dependent on the accuracy of its assumptions 
as to the rationality of economic actors? Is Posner merely repeating 
Friedman, or is he misinterpreting him? Blaug shows that if one 
carefully parses Friedman's language, one can make an argument 
100 NAGEL, supra note 56, at 508. 
101 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 12, at 14. 
102 BLAUG, supra note 18, at 97. As I shall discuss, although Friedman's sloppy language 
gives Samuelson plenty of ammunition, it is not clear that Friedman ever really adopts the 
strong form of the F-twist, although Posner certainly does. One can, however, also chide 
Samuelson for adopting a soft form of F-twisting in practice. As I discuss in Economic 
Rationality, Samuelson proposes his theory of revealed preferences precisely because he 
implicitly thinks that we cannot reliably determine the actual subjective states of economic 
subjects. Consequently, he makes no attempt to empirically test his hypothesis that choices 
reveal preferences. As a result, he comes very close to asserting that people act "as if their 
choices coincided with their preferences. See Schroeder, Economic Rationality, supra note 8. 
103 See, e.g.,2 HERBERT A. SIMON, MODELS OF BOUNDED RATIONALITY (BEHAVIORAL 
ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS ORGANIZATION) xix (1982) [hereinafter SIMON, MODELS]. 
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that Friedman never quite adopts the F-twist (i.e., the proposition 
that a theory can be valid even if its assumptions are patently false). 
If Friedman does not adopt the F-twist, however, it is far from clear 
what he is in fact saying. As we shall see, regardless of what 
Friedman had in mind, Posner accepts the F-twist and gives it 
another turn, arriving at his own F-twist. 
Blaug tries to partially defend Friedman on the grounds of 
historical context. If Friedman used extreme language in defending 
the rationahty postulate, this was only because he was responding to 
a methodological argument current at the time he was writing that 
was itself worded in absolutist, intemperate language. Early- to mid-
twentieth-century critics of neoclassical economics concentrated on 
attacking the strict accuracy of its imderlying assumptions while 
ignoring its predictive power. That is, they attacked the abstraction 
of assumptions and demanded photographic concreteness. It is 
hardly surprising, therefore, that defenders of neoclassical economics 
would try to draw attention away from the empirical accuracy of the 
model and toward its usefulness. Unfortunately, the extremist 
rhetoric of the critics inspired an extremist response: 
The style of this criticism, which was invariably accompanied by 
the crudest of objections to the assumptions of standard theory, 
paying absolutely no attention to its predictive content, 
inevitably produced the reaction among defenders of received 
doctrine that "assumptions are largely irrelevant." ... Taken 
with the accusation that no theory with counterfactual 
assumptions can be taken seriously, the thesis of the irrelevance 
of assumptions is almost excusable.^"" 
In other words, Friedman was responding to critics that demanded 
that a theory be "the whole truth," in the sense of being a totally 
accurate description of a phenomenon in all respects—surely an 
impossibly strict standard that no scientific theory could ever meet. 
What then, does Friedman mean when he suggests that the 
realism of assumptions is irrelevant, or that unrealism of assumptions 
may be a virtue? First, as Blaug points out, Friedman never quite 
makes the blunt statement of which Samuelson accuses him: that he 
is denying the necessity of truth claims in scientific theories. 
Friedman always modifies his position by saying that the realism of 
assumptions is "largely" irrelevant.^"^ Indeed, interpreting Friedman 
is difficult precisely because he tends to put the word "assumptions" 
in quotation marks and never defines his terms.^°® 
104 Id. 
105 See BLAUG, supra note 18, at 97. 
106 See id. at 94. 
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[Friedman] does not even explicitly distinguish between initial 
conditions, auxiliary hypotheses, and boundary conditions.... 
[AJssumptions in economics may refer to (1) statements of 
motivation such as utility and profit maximization; (2) 
statements of overt behavior of economic agents; (3) statements 
of the existence and stability of certain functional relationships; 
(4) restrictions on the range of variables to be taken into 
account; and (5) boundary conditions under which the theory is 
held to apply. 
Blaug takes Friedman to task for his naive "notion that theories can 
be neatly divided into their essential components and that the 
empirical searchlight is to be directed solely at the implications and 
never at any other parts of the theory Indeed, Friedman 
does argue, in what Blaug describes as "a frequently overlooked 
section""' of his essay, that assumptions can be used as an indirect 
test of a theory."" Friedman's plaint against testing assumptions 
might be just another form of denying the validity of verification as a 
methodology. That is, Friedman might be using the term 
"assumptions" to mean affirmative statements of presumed 
grounding facts on which a theory is based. To test an assumption 
might, therefore, be considered an attempt to verify these facts. 
Thus we can paraphrase Blaug's attempt to give Friedman the 
benefit of the doubt and rewrite his reliance on the dubious 
distinction between the assumptions and implications of a theory as 
follows. First, when examining a theory, it is not useful to distinguish 
between what is an assumption and what is a conclusion, let alone 
between types of assumptions. Consequently, a theory should be 
tested as a whole, not with respect to its component parts. This is so 
partly because, in order to theorize, one needs to abstract from 
concrete, empirical reality. Abstraction is the identification of 
salient points for a specific purpose, i.e., for use as part of a theory. 
The test of the appropriateness of an abstraction, therefore, should 
be a test of how it works in the context of the theory. Friedman 
believes that the use of economic theory should be prediction of 
economic behavior. This means that the test of a theory is whether 
all of its component parts, taken as a whole, serve this purpose (i.e., 
whether the theory makes accurate predictions). 
Second, when Friedman asserts that assumptions may, or 
must, be unrealistic (or that lack of realism is a virtue in 
theorization), he is not necessarily suggesting that economists 
should go out and seek to make their assumptions unrealistic. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. at 104. 
109 Id. at 93. 
110 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 12, at 26-30. 
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Indeed, his description of theory formation has much in common 
with Popperian methodology. That is, one does not draw one s 
starting assumptions out of thin air. One starts with empirical data 
as the basis of the initial hypothesis—one engages in abduction in 
order to try to explain a surprising thing. According to Friedman: 
Empirical evidence is vital at two different, though closely 
related, stages: in constructing hypotheses and in testing their 
validity. Full and comprehensive evidence of the phenomena to 
be generalized or "explained" by a hypothesis, besides its 
obvious value in suggesting new hypotheses, is needed to assure 
that a hypothesis explains what it sets out to explain—that its 
implications for such phenomena are not contradicted m 
advance by experience that has already been observed. 
In other words, one's working assumptions are grounded in 
empirical observation. In this context, what Friedman seems to be 
suggesting is that one does not then test the hypothesis drawn from 
these initial assumptions by seeking to verify the assumpbons 
themselves, but by seeking to falsify the implications drawn from 
these assumptions.^^^ • a 
The problem with these generous interpretations of Friedman is 
that they fly in the face of other statements made in his essay. As 
Blaug points out, Friedman suggests that assumptions underlying 
theories might be unrealistic in two ways other than abstraction. An 
assumption might be unrealistic because it does not "ascribe n^otwes 
to economic actors that we, fellow human bemgs, find 
comprehensible.""^ That is, as I shall discuss below Friedman 
rejects what is known as the Verstehen doctrine, or "methodological 
individualism.""" Second, assumptions may be unrealistic in the 
sense that they "are believed to be either false or highly improbable 
in light of directly perceived evidence 
As we shall see,""" in at least one example given in his essay, 
Friedman proposes assumptions that are not merely abstract or 
partially true, but are completely and irrefutably false. Morewer, 
Friedman's methodology should be distinguished at this point from 
Popper's. In contrast. Popper only suggested that the initw/working 
assumptions of a proposed hypothesis were "irrelevant" to the 
scientific process; he did not suggest that the truth or reality of a 
theory's ultimate assumptions was irrelevant."" This is because 
i n  M a t  1 2 .  
112 See id. at 13-14. 
113 BLAUG, supra note 18, at 92. 
114 See discussion infra Part I.C.4. 
115 BLAUG, supra note 18, at 93. 
116 See infra notes 174-80 and accompanying text. 
117 See infra notes 209-27 and accompanying text. 
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falsification allows a scientist to eliminate serially all false 
assumptions. Consequently, if scientists are unable to falsify a 
theory after repeated experimentation, then one has reason to 
believe that any assumptions that remain standing after falsification 
are true. In other words, we can safely ignore the question of the 
validity of our initial assumptions only if, like Popper, we are 
confident that all false assumptions can eventually be eliminated 
through falsification. 
In other words, Popperian falsification is a methodology 
designed precisely to determine the truth or falsity of assumptions. 
Perhaps the most generous reading of Friedman's approach is that 
Friedman retained a healthy skepticism as to Popper s epistemology 
and continued to question the assertion that man can achieve 
metaphysical knowledge through science. If one accepts Popper s 
assertion that all scientific theories are fallible and corrigible, then 
one can never get beyond mere intersubjective consensus to 
"objective" truth."® 
5. The Practicability of Falsifying Assumptions 
As we have seen, it is not Friedman's preference for falsification 
that is remarkable (since this is a widely, but far from universally, 
accepted notion of scientific methodology). Rather, it is his 
suggestion that one cannot also directly test a theory by falsifying (as 
opposed to verifying) its assumptions, or his implication that the 
truth of a theory has no relationship to the truth of the assumption. 
Part of Friedman's argument seems implicitly to be based on the 
assertion that we cannot directly test the assumptions of the 
rationality postulate because it is difficult, if not impossible, to test 
assertions about the subjective mind-sets of economic actors. 
Ironically, as I discuss in Economic Rationality, although Samuelson 
considers himself a critic of Friedman's methodology, Samuelson's 
own theory of revealed preferences ("RPT") is similarly founded on 
the alleged problematics of directly observing the subjective 
preferences that constitute the base assumptions of the rationality 
postulate."' But if Friedman's claim is merely based on an assertion 
of empirical difficulty, then he should be open to suggestions about 
how these difficulties might be overcome."" Indeed, his critics pomt 
118 Consequently, in Popper's words: "The game of science is, in principle, without end" 
POPPER, SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY, supra note 33, at 53. 
n9 See Schioeder, Economic Rationality, supra note 
120 5ee BLAUG, supra note 18, at 96. Sen makes a similar point m his critique of he 
methodology of Friedman's arch-rival, Paul Samuelson. Samuelson's theory of revealed 
preferences is based on the implicit, but untested, assumption that there is no reliable 
means of testing people's actual preferences and subjective states. As Sen suggests. 
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out that the testing of predictions suffers from precisely the same 
type of empirical difficulties and ambiguities as the testing of 
assumptions: "[Djirect evidence about assumptions is not necessarily 
more difficult to obtain than data about market behavior used to test 
predictions or, rather,... the results of examining assumptions are 
not any more ambiguous than the results of testing 
predictions 
Moreover, his critics assert, if Friedman truly believes that 
"accurate predictions are ... the only relevant test of the vahdity of a 
theory[,]... [then] it would be impossible to distinguish between 
genuine and spurious correlations ... Friedman anticipates this 
criticism and attempts to preempt it with a version of Ockham's 
razor: "The choice among alternate hypotheses equally consistent 
with the available evidence must to some extent be arbitrary, though 
there is general agreement that relevant considerations are 
suggested by the criteria 'simphcity' and 'fruitfulness,' themselves 
notions that defy completely objective specification."'^^ Elegance 
and beauty are, indeed, characteristics of many successful scientific 
theories. Moreover, even arch-falsifier Popper agreed that there is a 
necessary aesthetic or, in his words, "subjective"'^" aspect in the 
choice of one's initial hypothesis. Popper, however, sought to 
distinguish the subjective moment in all human activity from the 
objective one of scientific methodology.'^^ As we shall see. Popper 
argued that his proposed method of falsification was precisely a 
method of testing one's initial hypothesis in order objectively and 
scientifically to choose one's final hypothesis.'^® Ironically, Friedman 
and Posner wind up promoting not falsification, as they claim, but 
the theory proposed by falsification's most well-known critic, 
Thomas Kuhn. Kuhn famously argued that there is no logical way to 
[The] thrust of the revealed preference approach has been to undermine 
thinking as a method of self-knowledge and talking as a method of knowing 
about others. In this, [Sen thinks], we have been prone, on the one hand, to 
overstate the difficulties of introspection and communication, and on the other, 
to underestimate the problems of studying preferences revealed by observed 
behaviour. 
SEN, supra note 71, at 72. 
Similarly, Friedman's insistence that assumptions not be tested directly, but only 
indirectly by testing implications, might overstate the difficulties of doing the former and 
underestimate the difficulties of doing the latter. 
121 BLAUG, supra note 18, at 96. 
122 Id. 
123 FRIEDMAN, supra note 12, at 10. 
124 POPPER, SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY, supra note 33, at 31. 
125 Popper characterized his project as that of "demarcation"—distinguishing what he 
seemed to consider the uniquely reliable process called "science" from other useful processes 
such as "common sense." See id. at 19-20,34. 
126 See infra text accompanying notes 209-18. 
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choose between rival paradigms so one must inevitably fall back on 
"good," but nonobjective, reasons like "accuracy, scope, simplicity, 
fruitfulness, and the like."^^^ Similarly, Friedman concludes that the 
choice between hypotheses is "to some extent arbitrary" but that 
"relevant considerations" include "simphcity" and "fruitfulness."^^® 
In addition to questioning the empirical difficulty of testing 
assumptions, and raising the false correlation problem, Friedman's 
critics have argued: 
[T]he attempt to test assumptions may yield important insights 
that help us to interpret the results of predictive tests; and ... if 
predictive testing of theories with patently counterfactual 
assumptions is indeed all that we can hope for, we ought to 
demand that our theories be put to extremely severe tests.^^' 
C. Arguments Drawn from the "Hard" Sciences 
1. Misdescription of Galileo 
Friedman tries to defend his assertion as to the irrelevance of 
the realism of assumptions by reference to physics. An examination 
of his example shows that Friedman's description is either worded in 
a misleading way or evidences a fundamental confusion about the 
laws of physics (and, once again, about the concepts of "partial" and 
"abstract" on the one hand and "unrealistic" or "nontrue" on the 
other). Accordingly, Friedman's description of the laws of physics 
has rightfully become a lightning rod for attacks by his critics. 
Friedman notoriously gives the example of the laws of falhng 
bodies as first proposed by Gahleo and developed by Newton.^®" 
Fosner repeats the same example, without attribution."^ Friedman 
states that the law is unrealistic because it "assumes" that bodies fall 
in vacuums."^ "Testing this hypothesis by its assumption presumably 
means measuring the actual air pressure and deciding whether it is 
127 Thomas S. Kuhn, Reflections on My Critics, in CRITICISM AND THE GROWTH OF 
KNOWLEDGE 231, 261 (Imre Lakatos & Alan Musgrave eds., 1970) [hereinafter Kuhn, 
Reflections]. 
128 FRIEDMAN, note 12, at 10. 
129 BLAUG, supra note 18, at 96. 
130 For simplicity, I will follow Friedman in writing as though Newton's laws of motion 
were still the accepted scientific paradigm. It is common knowledge that Newtonian physics 
has been supplanted by Einsteinian physics and quantum mechanics. It is not the case that 
Newtonian physics is still theoretically true for the macroworld, but Einsteinian physics rules 
the microworld. Nevertheless, Newtonian physics approximates the movement of bodies in 
the macroworld with sufficient accuracy to serve for law professors to ignore Friedman's 
inaccuracy. 
131 See POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 16, at 18. 
132 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 12, at 18. 
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close enough to zero.""^ It is common knowledge that cannonballs 
and feathers fall at different speeds in the atmosphere.^^^ Friedman 
concludes that scientists accept the law of falling objects only with 
respect to the objects that fall in an atmosphere in a way that is 
sufficiently close to that predicted in a vacuum to say that the theory 
"works" for those objects, but not in those circumstances when it 
doesn't "work."^^' Consequently, according to Friedman, we arcept 
the theory as "working" for things like cannonballs, but reject it for 
things like feathers."® 
Friedman concludes from this that scientists accept the law ot 
falling bodies for cannonballs despite its "unrealistic" assumption 
that cannonballs fall in vacuums. Moreover, he asserts; "This 
example illustrates both the impossibility of testing a theory by its 
assumptions and also the ambiguity of the concept 'the assumptions 
of a theory.'""^ He rewrites the theory of falling bodies to mean: 
"[Ujnder a wide range of circumstances, bodies that fall in the actual 
atmosphere behave as if they were falling in a vacuum. 
Before proceeding, we should note that, even though Friedman 
claims that the assumption that objects fall in a vacuum is 
"unrealistic," the theory of falling bodies purports to say somethmg 
about how objects do fall in a vacuum that is "true" in the limited 
sense that it describes observed motion. Moreover, although it 
might be correct to suggest that Galileo, Newton, et aL abducted the 
theory of falling bodies by abstracting from empirical observation of 
actual bodies falling in the earth's atmosphere, it is not correct to say 
that the only way scientists test this theory is by further observation 
133 Id. at 16. Posner similarly writes: "Newton's law of falling bodies is unrealistic in its 
basic assumption that bodies fall in a vacuum...POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra 
"°i34 ptobably all of us have heard at some point the anecdote that Galileo iiwtituted the era 
of modern scientific experimentation, which supplanted the earlier Aristotelian speculative 
science, by demonstrating that objects of different weight fall at the saine si^ed by dropping 
two objects from the Leaning Tower of Pisa and observing that both hit the ground at the 
same time. A moment's thought will reveal that this must be a myth became m the earth s 
atmosphere objects of different weights or sizes usually fall at different speeds. Galiko s new 
methodology consists not merely of empirical observation, but also of the ability of abstracti g 
eenerally applicable rules from diverse empirical data. 
135 FRIEDMAN, supra note 12, at 17. Posner says the law of falling boAes is still a useful 
theory because it predicts with reasonable accuracy the behavior of a wide vanety of falling 
bodies in the real world." POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 16, at 18. Fnedman 
does correctly note that one needs to decide what it means to say that something work^hat 
is what standard to apply. Presumably, given that Friedman's goal is predictability, the 
answer to this question would be based on what one wishes to predict and the degree of 
accuracy one is seeking. A thorough discussion of this topic is beyond the scope of this 
Article. 
136 FRIEDMAN, supra note 12, at 17. 
137 Id. at 17-18. 
138 Id. at 18. 
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of objects in the earth's atmosphere. Nor is it correct to say that 
scientists who theorize about movement—or even engineers who use 
this theory for practical purposes—^accept the theory for objects for 
which this result can be replicated and reject it for other objects. 
Rather, scientists try to replicate in reality the conditions of the 
theory in its abstract state to see if the theory holds—d.e., they, in 
fact, test the assumptions. For example, I remember seeing a science 
film in elementary school in which the scientist (actor) first dropped 
two objects in a glass jar containing air—demonstrating how 
differently they fell in an atmospher^and then pumped the air out 
of the jar and repeated the experiment. As predicted, the two 
objects fell at the same speed and hit the ground at the same time. 
In other words, the theory was shown to be an accurate predictor of 
movement of both weights and feathers in a vacuum. 
Simon aptly criticizes this aspect of Friedman's theory: 
I am not satisfied with the answers to Friedman's argument that 
he has as much right as the physicists to make unreal 
assumptions. Was Galileo also guilty of using the invalid 
principle of unreality? I think not. I think he was interested in 
behaviour in perfect vacuums not because there aren't any in 
the real world, but because the real world sometimes 
sufficiently approximates them to make their postulation 
interesting.^^' 
Friedman was writing in the mid-1950s when, perhaps, the 
thought of objects moving in vacuums seemed like a strange starting 
place for theorization of the laws of motion. However, from the 
point of view of astrophysics, hypothesizing about how planets, 
satellites, and other vehicles move in the relative vacuum of space 
seems completely appropriate. Indeed, I suspect that from the 
vantage point of the turn of the millennium, after decades of 
watching space flights on television, the proposition no longer seems 
strange, let alone unrealistic, to the average American. 
In his book on the nature of scientific explanation, Nagel uses 
the same example to describe classic scientific methodology in a way 
that is subtly, but decisively, different from Friedman. "We begin by 
noting the familiar fact that the experimental evidence for the 
universal laws of physical science is rarely if ever in perfect 
agreement with them."^"" This certainly is one of the things that 
Friedman is trying to capture when he says that science does not 
merely describe phenomena in the sense of ticking off all empirical 
data. In contrast to Friedman, however, Nagel interprets scientists 
as very much trying to describe the phenomena to be studied as 
139 SIMON, MODELS, supra note 103, at 370. 
140 NAGEL, supra note 56, at 508. 
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accurately as practicable. In Simon's words: "[Ujnreality of premises 
is not a virtue in scientific theory it is a necessary evil—a concession 
to the finite computing capacity of the scientist that is made tolerable 
by the principle of continuity of approximation.""^ That is, the 
scientist understands that a meaningful scientific description is 
hmited to those aspects of the phenomena germane to the problem 
at hand. Indeed, science may be seen as the very act of such 
limitation. Nagel continues: 
Accordingly, if physicists were to formulate their laws in strict 
adherence to what observation establishes about physical 
phenomena, those laws would have a statistical rather than a 
universal form. For example, had Galileo sought to establish 
the laws for freely falling bodies simply by correlating observed 
data, he would certainly have found that the velocity of falling 
bodies varies with their weight and shape; and he would have 
also found that there is only a high correlation rather than an 
invariable proportionality between the distances bodies fall and 
the squares of the lapsed times of their fall, so that a 
generalization based entirely on these findings would have been 
statistical in form."^ 
Friedman, therefore, is mistaken when he asserts that a more 
complete theory of falling objects has been developed "largely as a 
result of attempts to explain the errors of the simple theory.""^ As 
the passage from Nagel makes clear, the theory that objects fall a 
certain way in a vacuum is not "erroneous" because objects on earth 
do not usually fall in vacuums. Rather, the theory is "true" precisely 
because the necessary corollary to the theory that objects fall a 
certain way in vacuums is that they should be expected to fall 
differently in different circumstances that deviate from the ideal and 
that the deviations should be measurable and predictable. As Simon 
states: 
Whatever our admiration for Galileo's law describing the fall of 
a body in a vacuum, we do not use it to predict the movement 
of parachutes or of meteors in the earth's atmosphere. If we 
wish to test the law, we test it in vacuo or a reasonable 
approximation thereto—^that is, under conditions where the 
assumptions are nearly true, not under conditions where they 
are egregiously false. When we apply the theory to real-world 
problems, we supply such elaborations, in the form of terms to 
take account of air resistance, or friction, or whatever the 
sources of complication may be, as may be necessary to fit the 
theory to the actual conditions of application. In imagining that 
141 SIMON, MODELS, supra note 103, at 371. 
142 NAGEL, supra note 56, at 508. 
143 FRIEDMAN, supra note 12, at 18 (emphasis added). 
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theories are used in their simplest idealized form, ignoring the 
real-world complications, Friedman has drawn a fictitious 
picture of how theories are actually employed in physical 
science and engineering and has given bad advice as to how 
they should be employed in economics."'* 
Even tmder the methodology of sophisticated falsification (which I 
discuss below),"' if we assume that Galileo's original formulation of 
his hard-core hypothesis was merely that objects fall a certain way 
(i.e., under any circumstances, without limitation to vacuums), the 
hard core of this theory would not be deemed "erroneous" because 
we observe that actual objects often fall at a slower speed. Nor is the 
hard core necessarily falsified by this observation. The differential of 
the motion of objects as observed and as predicted is, at most, an 
empirical anomaly that seems inconsistent with the base or hard-core 
theory of falling bodies. As I discuss below,"® pursuant to a 
falsification methodology, it is the job of the scientist at this point 
neither to correct "errors" in the theory nor to reject the theory. 
Rather, the falsifier now tries to abduct auxiliaries to the hard core 
of the theory that might explain these apparent anomalies. The 
scientist then develops a research program designed to test the 
auxiliaries by seeking to observe empirical data inconsistent with 
them. 
As I have aheady quoted, Nagel states that the methodology of 
many natural sciences is to develop "laws as universally vahd under 
certain 'ideal' conditions ... and to account systematically for ^y 
discrepancies between what the laws assert and what observation 
reveals in terms of more or less well-authenticated discrepancies 
between those ideal conditions and the actual ones under which 
observations are made.""' In other words, a scientific theory does 
not ignore empirical reality and make unrealistic "assumptions," nor 
does it merely exclude empirical phenomena that do not 
approximate the predictions of the theory, as Friedman suggests. 
Rather, although a theory in form may apply only to "pure cases" or 
idealized versions of the phenomena to be studied, it also in practice 
accounts for empirical deviations. Scientists do not, as Friedman 
comes close to saying, develop one hard-core theory of objects in a 
vacuum that applies to objects like cannonballs, and other theories 
to correct the vacuum "error" that apply to objects like feathers. 
They, instead, develop an integrated theory that accounts for the 
114 SIMON, MODELS, supra note 103, at xix. 
145 See infra text accompanying notes 251-56. 
146 See infra text accompanying notes 251-56. 
147 NAGEL, supra note 56, at 508. 
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movement of all objects given atmospheric pressure and other forms 
of friction. 
At this stage in the argument, Friedman makes another good 
point, although once again worded in misleading and idiosyncratic 
terminology. He states: 
[Tjhe difference in shape of the body can be said to make 15 
pounds per square inch significantly different from zero for a 
feather but not for a compact ball dropped a moderate distance. 
Such a statement must, however, be sharply distinguished from 
the very different statement that the theory does not work for a 
feather because its assumptions are false. The relevant relation 
runs the other way: the assumptions are false for the feather 
because the theory does not work. This point needs emphasis, 
because the entirely valid use of "assumptions" in specifying the 
circumstances for which a theory holds is frequently, and 
erroneously, interpreted to mean that the assumptions can be 
used to determine the circumstances for which a theory holds, 
and has, in this way, been an important source of the belief that 
a theory can be tested by its assumptions."** 
Note, we have just seen that Friedman's statement that the 
assumptions of the law of falling bodies are false for a feather is 
incorrect, because the theory does not posit that objects fall at a 
certain speed under all circumstances. But, as I have argued, the 
theory holds that objects fall at a certain speed under ideal 
circumstances and therefore fall at different speed if actual conditions 
deviate from the ideal. Friedman's misleading terminology 
unfortunately disguises the very good point in this passage. A good 
theory specifies as part of the theory the conditions under which it is 
valid. A theory of the movement of falling objects must specify the 
conditions that affect its movement. The first law of movement 
specifies that it is universally valid and that it can be directly 
observed when there are no countervailing forces affecting the 
movement of an object. Because a vacuum lacks the conditions of 
friction caused by an atmosphere, good predictions of how objects 
fall in a vacuum can be based solely on the first law of movement. 
This does not mean, as Friedman imphes, that the law of motion 
does not "really" apply to objects in an atmosphere, but that in order 
to predict how empirical objects will actually move in a specific 
atmosphere we must also consider other factors that affect the 
movement of objects. 
As Nagel notes, scientific theory does not merely note (as 
Friedman and Posner do) that there is a discrepancy between 
concrete, empirical actuality and the abstract, theoretical potentiality 
148 FRIEDMAN, supra note 12, at 19. 
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of a hypothesized ideal. Rather, it seeks "to account systematically 
for any discrepancies" between the actual and the ideal."" As a 
daughter of an aerospace engineer who designed guidance systems 
intended to deliver missiles launched from the United States to 
targets in the Soviet Union and China, I know that scientists and 
engineers who applied their theories believed that they knew how to 
add the real-world facts of friction, etc., to the abstractions of 
Newtonian theory to produce deadly accurate results. 
2. Inapt Analogy 
Even if we were to accept arguendo Friedman's misleading 
terminology—i.e., that Galileo's assumptions are "unrealistic"—the 
analogy between the "unreahsm" of Galileo's assumptions and the 
"unreahsm" of the assumption of economic rationality fails. 
As we have seen, physicists working in the Galilean tradition (as 
subsequently modified over the centuries by Newton, Einstein, et 
al.) abstract how objects would move in ideal conditions. This is only 
"unreal" in the sense that, in the real world, the conditions under 
which objects fall are rarely ideal. However, physicists assert that 
the theory is nevertheless true: if we were to produce the ideal 
conditions objects would so fall. And, indeed, by observing the 
movement of objects in the near-ideal conditions of man-made 
vacuums and of space, scientists have not been able to falsify the 
theory (i.e., heretofore, objects have only been observed falling as 
predicted). The nominalist skeptic might add that all that we can 
know is that the objects fall "as if the theory were true—but we in 
fact observe objects so moving. 
This is quite different from Friedman and Posner's assertion, 
which I discuss in the immediately following section, that markets act 
"as if economic subjects were rational.^'" They state that it is 
irrelevant that this is unrealistic in the sense that people (and firms) 
frequently, or usually, do not act rationally. Note, this is not saying 
that economic subjects would act rationally under ideal conditions, 
which would be the proper analogy to the example drawn from 
physics. If it were the same, then Friedman and Posner—like 
physicists—would try to falsify their theory by trying to replicate the 
ideal conditions of economic rationality and then attempt to observe 
behavior inconsistent with their predictions. And yet, this is 
precisely what Posner condemns when he criticizes JST!"' 
149 NAGEL,iMpra note 56, at 508. 
150 See infra text accompanying notes 154-58. 
151 See Posner, Behavioral Economics, supra note 6, at 1559. Posner states: "The 
rational-choice economist asks what 'rational man' would do in a given situation, and 
usually the answer is pretty clear and it can be compared with actual behaviour to see 
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Nagel does not refer to Friedman by name, but he might have 
been thinking of Friedman's essay when he criticizes the attempt by 
economists to develop universal laws, like the natural sciences. If 
one were to use Friedman's terminology, one might say that Nagel 
does criticize the assumptions of economics—or more accurately the 
way economists use these assximptions. Nagel says: 
[T]he discrepancy between the assumed ideal conditions for 
which economic laws have been stated and the actual 
circumstances of the economic market are so great, and the 
problem of supplying the supplementary assumptions needed 
for bridging this gap is so difficult, that the merits of the strategy 
in this domain continue to be disputed.'" 
In other words, economists ignore the phenomena they are in fact 
supposed to be explaining and have not adequately accounted for 
discrepancies between their ideal or pure cases (i.e., then* 
assumptions) and the empirical world. 
3. The "As If" Fallacy 
Friedman leaps from the incorrect statement that physicists 
posit that heavy, compact objects fall in an atmosphere "as if they 
are in a vacuum to an assertion that the neoclassical assumption of 
economic rationality is not necessarily a claim that economic actors 
are in fact rational, but merely that they act as if they are 
rational.'" Friedman uses the example of how an expert billiard 
whether the prediction is confirmed. Sometimes it is not confirmed-and so we have 
behavioral economics." Id. (citation omitted). Posner criticizes JST's attempt to take 
accoimt of observed behavior that does not confirm the predictions of rationality by 
characterizing it as mere "description" rather than theorization. Posner states: [Ij 
rational-choice theory bumps up against some example of irrational behavior, the examp e 
can be accommodated by changing the theory to allow for irrational behavior. But there 
is no greater gain in predictive power ..., in fact, there is a loss." Id. at 1560. But, as w 
shall see the consistent observation of data inconsistent with a theory's predictions is the 
very definition of falsification. The sophisticated falsifier must "deal with such 
apparently falsifying observations, either by rejecting the theory as falsified or by adopting 
auxiliaries to the original theory (in Posner's words, changing the theory). Moreover, it is 
hard to see how the predictive power of the theory would be lost by this type of change if, 
by Posner's own example, the observation of inconsistent behavior indicates that the 
current theory does not accurately predict economic behavior. In any event, despite 
Posner's criticism of the creation of auxiliaries in the light of inconsistent observations, this 
is precisely what Posner in fact does. 
152 NAGEL, supra note 56, at 509. . . 
153 For example, he describes the hypothesis that firms are rational profit maximizers: 
[Ulnder a wide range of circumstances individual firms behave as if they were 
seeking rationally to maximize their expected returns... [even though] 
businessmen do not actually and literally solve the system of simultaneous 
equations in terms of which the mathematical economist finds fi convement to 
express this hypothesis, any more than... falling bodies decide to create a 
vacuum. 
FRIEDMAN, supra note 12, at 21-22. 
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player makes "his shots as if he, knows the complicated mathematical 
formula" and "could estimate accurately by eye the angles, etc. 
describing the location of the balls, and could make lightning 
calculations from the formulas, and could then make the balls travel 
in the direction indicated by the formulas."^''' Friedman asserts that 
the hypothesis that the player acts as if he did go through this process 
is not dependent on the accuracy of the assumption that he actually 
did go through this process. He uses this argument to support the 
proposition that economists can continue to use the hypothesis that 
businesses act "as if" they rationally seek to maximize profits even 
though individual "businessmen do not actually and literally solve 
the system of simultaneous equations in terms of which the 
mathematical economist finds it convenient to express this 
hypothesis any more than... billiard players explicitly go through 
complicated mathematical calculations or falling bodies decide to 
create a vacuum."^^^ 
As tempting as it might be to ridicule it, let us leave aside, as a 
misstatement, Friedman's peculiar suggestion that Newton's law of 
falling objects suggests that objects act as if they create vacuums, and 
concentrate on his billiard player example. Once again, if all that 
this example was supposed to illustrate were that, under falsification, 
one cannot test hypotheses directly by trying to verify what thought 
process the billiard player used (perhaps by questioning him), but 
one can test them indirectly by predicting facts that would be 
inconsistent with the hypothesis and then searching for such 
inconsistent facts through controlled observation, it would be 
unremarkable. Nor would it be particularly remarkable if Friedman 
meant merely to express the common skepticism toward the 
reliability of testimony about individual mental states and thought 
processes (either because people frequently lack the self-critical 
facility necessary for analysis or because they are prone to self-
serving statements)."® Such skepticism would merely suggest that 
social scientists should put more faith in their subjects' deeds than in 
their words, not that economists need not study what their subjects 
in fact do. But Friedman suggests that he accepts the latter, more 
radical position; he asserts that either the proof of a hypothesis says 
nothing about the validity of its assumptions, or that falsifying 
assumptions might cast doubt on the validity of the theory. 
154 Id. at 21. 
155 Id. at 22 (emphasis added). 
156 As I discuss in Economic Rationality, such skepticism is common among economists and 
underlies Samuelson's revealed preference theory. See Schroeder, Economic Rationality, 
supra note 8. 
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Of course, Friedman chooses the billiards example because he 
assumes that it is obvious that the bUliard player is not enga^g m 
the form of calculation described in his theory, but only acting as it 
he did. In Friedman's words: "The billiard player, if asked how he 
decides where to hit the baU, may say that he 'just f||ures it out but 
then also rubs a rabbit's foot just to make sure .... Upon closer 
examination, one realizes that Friedman evinces a remarkably 
unsophisticated view of consciousness and mtelligence, as well as ot 
methodology and explanation. 
Note that Friedman assumes that the fact that the billiard player 
has no conscious awareness that he is making a calculation means 
that in fact his brain is not engaging m some sunilar cognitive 
activity. This implies that the only type of thinking is conscious 
thought. I believe that it is noncontroversial to say that not only 
psychoanalysts, but most scientists who study intelligent and 
language, believe that not all thought can be so hmited. This is 
shown not only in the existence of dreams, but m 
moments of free association we expenence everyday. Who has not 
had the experience of giving up on trymg to solve a problem t a 
seems intractable only to have the solution pop mto one « head later 
when one is consciously thinking of somethmg totally different (o 
not consciously thinking of anything at all, as wten one wakes up in 
the middle of the night with the solution)? The ° 
autistic savants, like the character played by Dustm Hoffman m the 
movie Rainman, also suggests that human bemgs can engage in 
mathematical calculations without being conscious of the procedure^ 
Every computer in existence makes complex calculations^ndeed 
they can make much more complex calculations than predicting the 
movement of a billiard ball in much less time than it takes for a 
player to make a shot-despite the fact that, as far as we can tell 
thev lack any capacity for even the most primitive form o 
consciousness. That is, the ability to calculate—m the sense of 
processing information—is not necessarUy the same thmg as 
conscious thought. , 
In other words, although Friedman may be correct from the 
perspective of a falsifying methodology that one cannot prove a 
theory by verifying (or even falsifying) the existence of underlymg 
factual assumptions, it does not follow that the accuracy o 
predictions and the truth of assumptions are totally disconnected. 
Lther, the accuracy of predictions can be evidence that he 
assumptions are true. The observation that one can predict the 
movement of a bilUard ball through certam mathematical 
157 FRIEDMAN, supra note 12, at 22. 
388 CARDOZO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22:351 
calculations, combined with the fact that people often engage in 
complex forms of unconscious thought, could lead to the hypothesis 
that a good bilhard player is one who undergoes an unconscious 
mental process very much like the mathematical calculation. I said 
evidence, of course, but not proof. This is because the truth of the 
assumptions is merely an abduction drawn from the accuracy of the 
predictions (in that it is a story that would make the accuracy of the 
prediction seem to be in the ordinary course). 
4. Verstehen Doctrine 
Another criticism of the "as if fallacy is that it conflicts with the 
theoretical underpinnings of neoclassical economics. One of the 
great methodological traditions in the social sciences is the Verstehen 
doctrine, sometimes known as "methodological individualism." As 
its name (German for "understanding") suggests, Verstehen doctrine 
posits that a theory of human action can only be understood "from 
within by means of intuition and empathy."'^® It must constitute 
"first-person knowledge that is intelligible to us as fellow human 
beings.'"®' Although Verstehen doctrine may not be directly 
applicable to the physical sciences that deal with such things as 
subatomic particles that we not only cannot empathize with, but also 
that, according to quantum mechanics, seem to act in ways that have 
no analogy in our everyday, macroworld experience (such as being 
simultaneously located in many probability locations at one time). 
Proponents insist, however, that "[n]ot only is Verstehen a necessary 
characteristic of adequate explanation in the social sciences, thus 
disqualifying such brands of psychology as Skinner's behaviorism, 
but it is also the source of unique strength as compared to the 
outsider's knowledge of physical scientists. 
The primary problems of pure Verstehen doctrine should be 
obvious, since subjective experience is the criterion of validity: (1) 
how do we distinguish deception from truth, and (2) more broadly, 
how does the community of social scientists come to intersubjective 
consensus?'^' Nevertheless, one need not adopt the extreme 
Verstehen view that first-person understanding is the only criterion 
158 BLAUG, supra note 18, at 43. 
159 Id. 
160 Id. 
161 In other words, Verstehen may be nothing more than a form of "abduction"—the 
spinning of a "just so" story that seems to offer a satisfactory account of a surprising thing. As 
we have seen, abduction is hypothesis formation, and one needs another theory or 
methodology to get from formation to proof. One alternative, of course, is a metaabductive 
theory explaining why our guesses can be expected to be correct. For example, since the 
Verstehen doctrine finds validity in empathetic understanding, it might be consistent also to 
posit that all humans have an empathetic ability to understand other humans so that 
intersubjective consensus can be achieved purely through empathy. 
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of validity to conclude that it is a criterion of validity in the social 
sciences. The failure of a social science theory to be first-person 
understandable is a reason to reject the theory, because "explanation 
in social science must run not in terms of physical cause and effect 
but in terms of the motives and intentions of individuals."^®^ 
Consequently, Popper, the areh-proponent of the methodology of 
falsification, was also a defender of methodological individualism— 
the principle "that explanations of social, political, or economic 
phenomena can only be regarded as adequate if they run in terms of 
the beliefs, attitudes, and decisions of individuals."'®^ Gary Lawson 
goes so far as to claim: 
Methodological individualism is simply a positive statement 
about the appropriate, indeed the only possible, objects of 
social scientific study [It] is simply recognition of the fact 
that because the behavior of institutions is really the behavior 
of individuals in particular institutional settings, "[t]he only way 
to a cognition of collectives is the analysis of the conduct of its 
members.'"®" 
Lawson goes too far—one should not mistake his confidence in 
methodological individualism and the repetition of his assertions for 
a reasoned argument or demonstration. There are many intellectual 
traditions—Hegelianism for one—^that posit that collectives cannot 
be reduced to a mere aggregation of individuals but have unique 
characteristics of their own.'®® One cannot dismiss these traditions by 
mere denial without considering the arguments made in their favor. 
Indeed, it is precisely the Friedman/Posner theory that markets act 
"as if" economic subjects are rational that does not require that we 
show that economic subjects are rational, and that adopts a 
definition of rationality that neither matches our intuitions of our 
own behavior nor our observations of the behavior of others, which 
is implicitly a denial of methodological individualism in favor of 
methodological collectivism. Nevertheless, Verstehen doctrine's 
162 BLAUG, supra note 18, at 43. 
163 Id. at 44. 
164 Lawson, supra note 89, at 59-60 (quoting LuDWiG VON MISES, THE ULTIMATE 
FOUNDATION OF ECONOMIC SCIENCE 81 (1962)). 
165 That is, people act differently as part of a collective than they do as separate individuals. 
Consequently, as in Hegel, the system is holistic and circular—collectives are not mere 
aggregates, and individuals are not merely parts of collectives, but just as collectives cannot be 
understood without a theory of the individual, the individual cannot be understood without a 
theory of the collective. This is the familiar gemeinschaftlgesellschaft dichotomy. 
Another example is sociologist Nicholas Luhmann's theory of autopoesis, which posits 
how social systems reproduce themselves without direct reference to individual decision 
making. See generally Arthur J. Jacobson, The Idea of a Legal Unconscious, 13 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 1473 (1992). 
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proposition that a theory of human nature should make intuitive 
sense is very appealing. 
Others, more generally, insist that the purpose of a theory is to 
provide an explanation of a phenomenon understood as a causal 
mechanism.i'^' Friedmanian "as if" instrumentalism "not only refuses 
to offer any causal mechanism linking business behavior to the 
maximization of returns; it positively rules out the possibility of such 
an explanation."^^' SpecificaUy, Friedman's critics charge him with 
impUcitly accepting the "symmetry" thesis, which has long smce 
been disproved. The notion that explanation is "prediction written 
backwards" is equivalent to the assertion that "there is a perfect, 
logical symmetry between the nature of explanation and the nature 
of prediction ...This methodology has been shown to rely 
entirely on deduction (and, of course, abduction); 
The universal laws that are involved in explanations are not 
derived by inductive generalization from individual instances; 
they are merely hypotheses, inspired conjectures if you like, 
that may be tested by using them to make predictions about 
particular events but which are not themselves reducible to 
observations about events.'^' 
Friedman's abandonment of Verstehen is particularly 
remarkable given that Friedrich von Hayek had advocated it as 
necessarily flowing from the very nature of neoclassical price theory. 
Price theory is a subset of that branch of social science that seeks to 
understand a collective or a whole in terms of its individual terms. In 
this case, the market is explained in terms of the aggregate behavior 
of economic subjects. Hayek contrasted "methodolog^l 
individualism" with "methodological collectivism." The 
preference for methodological individuahsm may denve as much 
from phUosophical as scientific concerns. As its name suggests, this 
methodology reflects the highly individuaUstic conception of human 
nature epitomized by Margaret Thatcher's famous assertion that 
there is no such thing as society, only individuals and their families. 
Or, in Lawson's words: 
[Wlhen one studies human behavior, one always studies the 
behavior of individual humans. There is simply nothing else to 
study: "[Tjhere are no such things as ends of or actions by 
166 See BLAUG, supra note 18, at 98. 
167 Id. at 91. 
168 Id. at 5. 
170 NAGEL, supra note 56, at 541 (citing F.A. HAYEK, THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION OF 
^^^ni See^Jon Margolis, Market Versus Family Values: GOP Debate Cut to Core About 
Conservatism's Vision, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 24,1996, § 2, at 7. 
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'groups,' 'collectives,' or 'States,' which do not take place as 
actions by various specific individuals." When we speak of the 
action of a group, as we often do, we speak metaphorically."^ 
If we are to understand collectives only as aggregates of individuals, 
then "on one version of the principle of methodological 
individualism, the social scientist is to 'continue searching for 
explanations of a social phenomenon tmtil he has reduced it to 
psychological terms.It is ironic, therefore, that Friedman and 
Posner could take a theory rooted in a radical individualistic 
philosophy and a desire to understand human psychology and 
purport to remove individual psychology from it. 
5. Demonstrably False Assumptions 
Perhaps the most telling example of how far Friedman's 
concept of scientific theory and explanation differs from the norm is 
his "constructed" theory of leaf density, which he believes is "an 
analogue of many hypotheses in the social sciences.""" Friedman 
asks, how can one accoimt for the fact that trees have more leaves on 
the south (the sunnier side) than the north? He writes: 
I suggest the hypothesis that the leaves are positioned as if each 
leaf deliberately sought to maximize the amount of sunlight it 
receives, given the position of its neighbors, as if it knew the 
physical laws determining the amount of sunlight that would be 
received in various positions and could move rapidly or 
instantaneously from any one position to any other desired and 
unoccupied position."^ 
He asks the supposedly rhetorical question: "Is the hypothesis 
rendered unacceptable or invalid because, so far as we know, leaves 
do not 'deliberate' or consciously 'seek,' have not been to school and 
learned the relevant law of science or the mathematics required to 
calculate the 'optimum' position, and cannot move from position to 
position?""® He declares that the hypothesis is not rendered 
unacceptable because "the contradictions ... are not within the 'class 
of phenomena the hypothesis is designed to explain'; the hypothesis 
172 Lawson, supra note 89, at 59 (quoting 1 MURRAY N. ROTHBARD, MAN, ECONOMY, 
AND STATE: A TREATISE ON ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 2 (1962)). I believe that, given 
Lawson's unexamined claim that there is nothing else to study other than individuals, Lawson 
protests too much when he asserts that methodological individualism "most emphatically is 
not a metaphysical claim about human autonomy, a psychological claim about the formation 
of preferences, or a normative celebration of separateness." Id. 
173 NAGEL, supra note 56, at 541 (quoting J.W.N. Watkins, Ideal Types and Historical 
Explanation, 3 BRIT. J. PHIL SCI. 29 (1952)). 
174 FRIEDMAN, supra note 12, at 19. 
175 Id. 
176 /d. at20. 









does not assert that leaves do these things but only that their density 
is the same as i/they did.""' 
Despite Friedman's unsupported assertions to the contrary, I 
believe most scientists would agree that these contradictions do 
indeed make the constructed hypothesis unacceptable, which is why 
it has not been adopted by botanists. I find it patently incredible that 
any botanist would be satisfied, as Friedman is, with the statement 
that trees look "as if' their leaves calculated and moved when our 
everyday experience indicates that individual leaves are neither 
sentient nor mobile. Rather, I would expect botanists to be 
interested in learning precisely what process causes leaves to become 
so clustered. . . , 
More important, Friedman's "explanation" is m fact no 
explanation at all. He observes that leaf density is greater on the 
sunny side of trees. He asserts that we can predict this behavior if we 
assume that this is so because leaves move to the sunny side of trees. 
Not only is this patently false, but the only thing that it predicts is the 
phenomenon already observed—that leaf density is greater on the 
sunny side of trees. In other words, this is not a theory that predicts 
a previously unobserved phenomenon, but merely a patently false ad 
hoc, and post hoc, explanation. 
Friedman's answer might be, in effect, "who cares" whether or 
not the assumption (in this case of calculation) is literally true or not, 
so long as the theory predicts the movement of billiard balls, leaf 
density, and the behavior of businesses. Once again, this response 
reflects Friedman's extraordinarily narrow view of scientific 
explanation. Perhaps this seems more obvious from the viewpoint of 
the turn of the millennium, when we are surrounded by wmputers 
and discussions of the possibility of creating artificial intelligence are 
commonplace. Perhaps Friedman and Posner personally do not care 
about how economic actors "in fact" make decisions and act, so long 
as they can predict aggregate market behavior with reasonable 
accuracy. (Even though, as I discuss in Economic Rationality,"^ 
behavioral economists claim that evidence shows that the 
assumption of economic rationality is a relatively poor predictor of 
market behavior.)"' Perhaps there are stUl some radical behaviorists 
177 Id. 
178 See Schroeder, Economic Rationality, supra note 8. 
179 As Brian Leiter has said: • • c-
Philosophers, too, have recently launched a devastating attack on the scientitic 
and cognitive credentials of economics, starting from the observation that 
"[elconomic theory is one of the more dismal empirical failures in the history of 
science " This is widely conceded about the laughably unsuccessful predictions 
of macroeconomics, but it is only somewhat less true of microeconomics, which 
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who only study "objective" behavior and claim not to care about (or 
even to suspect the existence of) subjective experience.^®" I doubt it. 
For example, to return to Friedman's leaf example, a more 
"realistic" hypothesis might be that a greater percentage of the 
leaves on the shady side of the tree wither and die, and a greater 
percentage of the leaves on the sunny side of the tree flourish; this 
would explain the phenomenon observed (relative leaf density) 
equally well with the advantage not only of being true, but also of 
suggesting other potential theories or "predictions" to test. That is, 
it suggests that leaves need a certain amount of light to live (a theory 
that one can attempt to falsify by placing part of a tree in total 
darkness and observing what happens), which would in turn lead to 
other theories about trees and other plants—such as the theory that, 
unlike we animals who obtain the energy necessary for survival from 
eating other animals or plants, plants that have leaves are able to 
obtain energy directly from sunlight (i.e., through photosynthesis). 
It should not be surprising that Simon, one of the most 
vociferous critics of Friedman's "unreality principle," was not only 
the father of behavioral economics, but also a theorist of artificial 
intelligence.^®' Both behavioral economics and artificial intelligence 
theory are concerned with how people actually do think and make 
decisions, and can never be satisfied with assertions that people act 
as if they thought a certain way. In Simon's terminology, he is 
concerned with defining procedural rationality (the process of 
thought), whereas Friedman only concerns himself with substantive 
rationality (the result of the process).'®^ The substantive approach 
seems to reflect a remarkable lack of curiosity about human nature 
and subjective experience. 
II. POSNERIAN METHODOLOGY 
A. Posner's Account 
Although Posner's stated methodology is based on Friedman's, 
he does differ in theory by being more extreme; he also violates his 
own stated precepts in practice. In his reply to JST, Posner repeats 
"has made no advances in the management of economic processes since its 
current formalism was first elaborated in the nineteenth century." 
Brian Leiter, Holmes, Economics, and Classical Realism, in THE PATH OF THE L/UVAND 
ITS INFLUENCE, 285, 305 (Steven J. Burton ed., 2000) (citations omitted). Economics is 
"better, perhaps, than astrology, but not much more predictively successful than common 
sense psychology." Id. at 304. 
180 See NAGEL, supra note 56, at 476-80, for a brief description of early behaviorism, which 
adopted something close to this strict standard. 
181 See, e.g., HERBERT A. SIMON, THE SCIENCES OF THE ARTIFIQAL (1969). 
182 See SIMON, MODELS, supra note 103, at 425-26. 
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Friedman's dichotomy between the descriptive accuracy and 
predictive power of a potential theory.^®' He declares that behavioral 
economics is flawed precisely because it is too empirical and is 
"defined by its subject rather than its method.'"^ "Describing, 
specifying, and classifying the empirical failures of a theory is a valid 
and important scholarly activity. But it is not an alternative 
theory. 
Regardless of whether one accepts Posner's characterization of 
JST's article specially, or of behavioral economics in general, so far, 
his statements are not that surprising. As already discussed,'®* all 
theory requires abstraction, and the process of abstraction, by 
necessity, suppresses many concrete features of specific phenomena. 
In this sense, the descriptive activities Posner damns with faint praise 
by labeling them "valid and important scholarly activities" are, 
therefore, by definition not theorization, because they do not 
abstract from reality. What Posner underplays, however, is that 
describing, specifying, and classifying empirical inconsistencies are 
the primary tools in the process of development, refinement, and 
testing of a hypothesis known as falsification—the methodology that 
Posner claims to champion. He also ignores the fact that, as 
discussed above, observation and description (and, therefore, 
specification and classification) are themselves forms of abstractions. 
According to Posner, "If a theory cannot be falsified, neither it 
nor its predictions can be validated, for everything that happens is by 
definition consistent with the theory.'"®' So far, so good. He 
continues: 
JST's theory seems perilously close to the abyss of 
nonfalsifiability; perhaps it has fallen in. When people act 
rationally, JST do not treat this as contradicting the assumption 
of bounded willpower. When people resist temptations, thus 
demonstrating strength of will, this is not treated as 
contradicting the assumption of bounded willpower. And when 
they act selfishly, this is not deemed a contradiction of the 
assumption of bounded self-interest.... So the question arises, 
what if any observation would falsify JST's theory?'®® 
183 See Posner, Behavioral Economics, supra note 6, at 1559 ("[I]n theory-making, 
descriptive accuracy is purchased at a price, the price being loss of predictive power."). 
181 Id. 
185 Id. at 1560. 
186 See supra text accompanying notes 86-104. 
187 Posner, Behavioral Economics, supra note 6, at 1560. 
188 Id. As stated before, my goal is to criticize Posner, not to defend JST. Nevertheless, I 
will once again point out that Posner is (clearly) mischaracterizing JST's position. They are 
not arguing that people are never economically "rational" in the classical sense, nor that they, 
on the contrary, are always weak of will, altruistic, or whatever. Rather, I believe that they are 
saying that human nature is neither wholly divine nor wholly bestial. Humans do not act 
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Nevertheless, despite his casting stones at JST, Posner can be 
charged with committing precisely the same sin. In this final Part, I 
introduce the classic account of fdsification as developed by Popper 
and his school. I then contrast Popperian falsification with Posner's 
methodology in theory and in practice. As has been argued by 
others before me, although Posner calls for an objective, fact-based 
analysis of legal issues, he in fact rarely, if ever, engages in empirical 
investigation.^'*' In Economic Rationality I show that many of 
Posner's claimed predictions of unobserved behavior are, in fact, ad 
hoc explanations of previously observed behavior.^'" In this Article, 
I further show that when Posner does hazard predictions, he merely 
uses the vocabulary of falsification while replacing it with the much 
easier, but less rehable, method of verification. I partially redeem 
Posner by suggesting that one can interpret him as implicitly 
adopting the first step (but only the first one) of the methodology 
that Popper's student Imre Lakatos called "sophisticated" 
falsification. This is abduction—the telling of just so stories. 
Nevertheless, although every journey starts with the first step, 
Posner remains far from his goal of estabhshing an appropriate 
methodology for legal analysis. 
B. Fosnerian Methodology v. Popperian Falsification 
This, O my Best Beloved, is a story—a new and a 
wonderful story—a story quite different from the other 
stories... 
Friedman and, therefore, Posner claim to be adherents of 
falsification. The most developed theory that states that scientific 
methodology should be limited to falsification is that developed by 
Karl Popper and his school.''^ 
purely economically rationally, but neither do they act purely irrationally. But it does not 
follow from this, as Posner suggests, that this means that man is totally unpredictable. JST are 
arguing that preliminary studies indicate that people have a tendency to deviate from the 
theoretical norm of economic rationality in fairly predictable ways in certain identifiable 
circumstances and that the rationality postulate needs to be modified with an auxiliary to 
account for these apparent anomalies. 
189 See Luban, supra note 28, at 1005. Luban describes Posner as arguing that "[d]ecisions 
at law, judicial or otherwise, must be based on a realistic, empirically informed, unsentimental, 
preferably quantitative comparison of costs and benefits...." Id. However, later Luban 
argues that although economics, one of the three keys to Posner's legal theories, is "a 
quantitative and empirical scientific discipline[,]" Posner's own model "creates too many 
uncertainties ... when Posner tries to move from the qualitative to the quantitative, from the 
imprecise to the precise." Id. at 1024. 
190 See Schroeder, Economic Rationality, supra note 8. 
191 KIPLING, supra note 1, at 199. 
192 There are other schools of philosophy of science. Willard Van Orman Quine, for 
example, rejects Popperian falsification as ad hoc and has developed a coherence theory that 


















At this point, I should at least note in passing that, although it is 
commonplace among lawyers and other lay people to follow Popper 
and identify scientific reasoning with falsification,'^' there is a good 
deal of disagreement among philosophers of science and practicing 
scientists whether this is the case, either in theory or practice. 
Indeed, one can argue that Popperian falsification is obsolete, n^vrng 
been superseded by more recent theories of saentific 
methodology."" What methods scientists actually follow in practice 
is another question."' It is yet another question entirely whether 
moral and legal questions can or should be decided by "scientific' 
methods. , ^ . u 
Although one need not go as far as Paul Feyerabend, who 
supposedly asserted that actual scientific practice is "anythmg 
goes,""" it is probably true that even the most ardent believer m 
falsification must, as a practical matter, combhie a number of 
different methodologies as well as "gut feeling" in scientific 
investigation."' W.V.O. Quine goes further in concludmg that 
supports induction. See W.V. QuiNE & J.S. ULLIAN, WEB OF Belief 65, 89-91 (2d ed 
1978") Popper wrote his Logik der Forschung in 1934 (published in English as The Logic f 
Scientific Discovery in 1959), and his theory has arguably been largely superseded m 
philosophic circles by more recent work. For an introduction to modern philosophy of science 
Lee piper, see David S. Caudill & Richard E. Redding, "Tw' S 
Paradox of Expertise and Interdisciplinarity in Federal Courts, 57 WASH. & LEE L RE . 
(2000). Nevertheless, because Posner claims to adopt the methodology of falsification, I shall 
limit myself to the theory of Popper and his school. . ^ «.» n 
193 Most famously, the United States Supreme Court, in Daubert v Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), wrote as though Popperian falsificanon was 
virtually universally accepted among scientists and philosophers of science. See id. at 592 95. 
194 Two recent commentators have suggested that the Daubert decision reflects a surprising 
ignorance of the last forty years of scholarship in this area, Caudll & Redding wpra no e 
192- John H. Mansfield, Scientific Evidence Under Daubert, 28 ST. MARY S L.J. 1 (1996). 
195 For an interesting account of how one of the most famous textbook examples of the 
experimental method at work in fact deviated far from the ideal of "falsification see Oliver 
Morton, Science in the Dark, WALL ST. J., Aug. 11, 1999, at A18 (discussing theories that 
purport to explain solar eclipses). . . , • „ „,oc a 
196 Although Paul Feyerabend has occasionally used this expression, he claims that it was 
ioke. "Anything goes" is a reductio ad absurdum of his actual position that science, hke any 
other scholarly endeavor, should not and cannot commit itself to any specific inethod. See 
PAUL FEYERABEND, SCIENCE IN A FREE SOCIETY 186 (1978). As I have Stated elsewhere: 
Feyerabend means to suggest that different methods may be more or less 
adequate for different tasks and that it is very difficult, if not impossible, to 
define ahead of time what method is best suited to the task at hand.... 11 Jo 
presume that one knows ahead of time which method will turn out to be the 
most adequate is to presuppose that one knows the very answM one is ^^efang 
Schroeder, Abduction, supra note 33, at 152 n.LOL; ice also PAUL KYERABEND, AGAWST 
METHOD (1975); PAUL FEYERABEND, FAREWELL TO REASON (1987). In the o 
Richard Rorty, "[Tlhe whole idea of 'being scientific' and of choosing tetween meth^ is 
confused." RICHARD RORTY, CONSEQUENCES OF PRAGMATISM 195 (1986). Although 
Feyerabend started as a student of Popper, he became one of his most vociferous cntics. 
197 As Gregory Crespi suggests: 
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falsification is incoherent as a methodology. As soon as one admits 
that one must develop auxiliary explanations to explain why 
empirical observation deviates from the hypothesis (as it must 
always do), then one is, in fact, admitting that one is not engaging in 
falsification. Consequently, despite their logical flaws, abduction and 
verification may be the only methods available in our imperfect 
world.^'® The theory of sophisticated falsification developed by 
Lakatos and championed by Blaug is an attempt to defend the 
practice of falsification against Quine's charge of ad hoceryl^ 
This debate, although extremely interesting, will not be resolved 
in this Article. Posner and Friedman have already taken sides with 
the falsifiers so I will in the next section limit myself to an internal 
criticism from within the falsification school. As shall be evident 
from the last section of this Article, whatever methodology is 
appropriate for science, I neither believe that law is or can be a 
science, nor that scientific methodology is the only or the best 
methodology for the study of law.^°° 
1. The Problem of Induction 
Proponents of falsification are reacting to the logical problem of 
induction. This problem is so familiar as to border on the banal. It is 
worth revisiting, however, because although it is easy enough to 
distinguish falsification and verification in theory, scientists 
frequently are unable to resist the temptation to confuse them in 
practice, because verification is so much easier to apply than 
It is no secret that models which satisfy strict faisifiability criteria are the 
exception rather than the rule, certainly in economics and perhaps even in the 
physical sciences. Faisifiability is a very severe standard and should be regarded 
as an aspirational ideal rather than a description of current scientific practice. 
Gregory Scott Crespi, The Mid-Life Crisis of the Law and Economics Movement: Confronting 
the Problems of Nonfalsifiability and Normative Bias, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 231, 239 
(1991) (citations omitted). 
198 See WILLARD VAN ORMAN QUINE, FROM A LOGICAL POINT OF VIEW 43 (2d ed. 
1961). 
199 See Schroeder, Abduction, supra note 33, at 168. Although I find Lakatos and Blaug's 
account of how research programs degenerate quite convincing, I find their assertion about 
the logical necessity of movement from a degenerate research program to a new and untested 
"progressive" research program to be less than persuasive. Feyerabend argues that, as a 
historical matter, scientists have frequently rejected old research programs for new ones that 
do not meet Lakatos's criterion that the latter have excess empirical content over the former. 
See Paul Feyerabend, Consolations for the Specialists, in CRITICISM AND THE GROWTH OF 
KNOWLEDGE, supra note 127, at 197, 220. Nevertheless, the Lakatos-Blaug account is the 
best defense of falsification as a practice that I have seen. 
200 Of course, even radical falsifier Popper does not disdain other forms of reasoning. He is 
merely trying to "distinguish sharply between objective science on the one hand, and 'our 
knowledge' on the other." POPPER, SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY, supra note 33, at 98. 
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falsification.^"^ In this section I show that this is an error that Posner 
routinely makes. 
Induction is the derivation of universal rules from specific 
examples.^® This is, of course, an extremely common mental 
process. It characterizes not only the eommon-law case method but 
also much of what is known as "common sense." Unfortunately, in 
contrast to deduction (the derivation of speeific eases from universal 
rules),^"^ one cannot absolutely prove, as a logical matter, the truth of 
the hypothesis derived from induction. 
Through induction, when one observes one thousand white 
swans and not a single black one, one might conclude that all swans 
are white and predict that all additional swans one might observe in 
the future will also be white. Nevertheless, no matter how many 
additional white swans one observes, this does not logically rule out 
the possibility that there might be some blaek swans out there hiding 
in the shadows. Indeed, it turns out that there is a species of black 
swans indigenous to (where else?) Australia. In other words, 
"verification"—defined as the attempt to prove the truth of a 
hypothesis by searching for observations that are consistent with the 
predictions drawn from one's hypothesis—is not a reliable 
methodology. 
Popper famously claimed to have "solved" the problem of 
induction.^"" Induction can be used negatively, not positively. That 
is, while no number of consistent observations can prove a 
hypothesis, even one inconsistent observation can theoretically 
201 This is an accusation that Blaug makes against his fellow economists. See, e.g., BLAUG, 
supra note 18, at 226 ("Despite continued appeal to the methodological norms of 
falsificationism, the whole of Becker's writings are positively infected by the easier option of 
verificationism "). However, Blaug notes that Friedman believes that "verification of the 
postulates or assumptions of economic theory is both unnecessary and misleading " Id. at 
110. Nonetheless, "[t]he prevailing methodological mood is not only highly protective of 
received economic theory, it is also ultrapermissible within the limits of the 'rules of the 
game' Modern economists frequently preach falsificationism,... but they rarely practice 
it; their working philosophy of science is aptly described as 'innocuous falsificationism.'" Id. at 
110-11 (citation omitted). 
202 To use Charles Sanders Peirce's example of an inductive syllogism: 
Case.— These beans are from this bag. 
Result.— These beans are white. 
.-.Rule.- All the beans from this bag are white. 
2 CHARI-ES S. PEIRCE, Deduction, Induction, and Hypothesis, in COLLECTED PAPERS OF 
CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE 373 (Charles Hartshorne & Paul Weiss eds., 1960) [hereinafter 
COLLECTED PAPERS]; see also Schroeder, Abduction, supra note 33, at 179-80. 
203 Peirce's example of a deductive syllogism is: 
Rule. — All the beans from this bag are white. 
Case.— These beans are from this bag. 
.-.Result.— These beans are white. 
2 PEIRCE, supra note 202, at 374; see also Schroeder, Abduction, supra note 33, at 179-80. 
204 See POPPER, OBJECTIVE KNOWLEDGE, supra note 30, at 8-9; see also Schroeder, 
Abduction, supra note 33, at 162. 
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disprove a hypothesis. (I say "theoretically" because I shall leave the 
pragmatic problems of actually applying falsification as a 
methodology and the resulting theory of sophisticated falsification to 
a subsequent section.) Consequently, Popper proposes that the only 
true scientific methodology is "falsification"—defined as the attempt 
to disprove a hypothesis through a search for observations that are 
inconsistent with predictions drawn from the hypothesis. 
Note that falsification, like verification, is a form of inductive 
reasoning. It can, therefore, never be used to prove directly the 
objective truth of a hypothesis. Popper, nevertheless, argued that 
falsification can be used to bring science closer to objective truth.^"' 
By repeated apphcation of the methodology of falsification, 
scientists can weed out false theories. Eventually, through a process 
of elimination or "apagogic" reasoning, we wiU arrive at the "truth" 
as the only theory left. The rub is that the problem of mduction 
informs us that we can never know for sure when we have arrived at 
a true theory. No matter how many times we have failed to observe 
data inconsistent with our hypothesis, there is always the logical 
possibility that the next observation will falsify our hypothesis. It is 
reasonable for scientists to tentatively accept a hypothesis that has 
not heretofore withstood repeated attempts to falsify it. 
Nevertheless, all such acceptances are merely contingent. To claim 
scientific status, a hypothesis must always remain fallible and 
corrigible.^"® 
2. Assumptions 
Although Posner claims to be engaging in scientific reasoning 
he, in fact, confuses the first step in scientific reasoning-
abduction—with the later steps of induction and deduction—and 
then further confuses falsification with verification. Let us now 
consider the process of forming hypotheses so that we can contrast it 
with the process of proving or demonstrating them. 
As I discussed in the previous Part,^"' Friedman and Posner 
state that the validity of the "assumptions" underlying a hypothesis is 
205 Popper has a very sophisticated—indeed postmodern—conception of "objective truth. 
He regards truth as a humanly created, intersubjective consensus that is reached through t e 
application of an agreed upon methodology, as opposed to correspondence mth whatever 
reality exists "out there." Nevertheless, Popper believed (or hoped) that through the scientific 
methodology of falsification, our objective knowledge might eventually approach external 
reality. 5eein)ra text accompanying notes 209-27. J 
206 As Popper reminds us, if one does not criticize oneself, one's rivals will be happy to do 
so. See POPPER, SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY, supra note 33, at 16. According to Mansfield, 
Popper de-emphasized the fact that finding facts consistent with a theory does provide some 
confirmation (but not certainty) of a hypothesis's truth and emphasized falsification "in order 
to encourage a skeptical attitude toward hypotheses." Mansfield, supra note 194, at 11. 
207 See supra text accompanying notes 42-45,132-57. 








irrelevant to the validity of the hypothesis. Popper, in contrast, 
insists that the first step in any scientific methodology is hypothesis 
formation—a process that necessarily comprises the development of 
a set of assumptions. Popper readily admitted that there was an 
inevitably ad hoc, subjective, "irrational," and (he thought) 
unscientific aspect to this necessary starting moment—there is no 
way logically to determine where to start.^°® Althou^ one's starting 
hypotheses usually originate in empirical observation, there is no 
way objectively to choose what facts to start from—observation 
requires a viewpoint and a viewpoint is always subjective.^"' 
Popper comes to the surprising conclusion that in some sense 
one's initial working assumptions are ultimately "irrelevant" to 
scientific process.^'" But this is not, as Friedman and Posner suggest, 
because a valid theory does not require valid assumptions (the F-
twist). Rather, it is because it is the assumptions themselves that are 
the very subject of falsification. In other words. Popper believes that 
initial assumptions are only irrelevant in the sense that the scientific 
process of falsification should eventually winnow out all bad 
assumptions so that the scientific community would approach 
consensus as to what the appropriate assumptions should be.^" 
As I have briefly discussed, Posner identified three "worlds" of 
truth. First there is the first world of objective reality that exists 





208 See POPPER, SCIENI IFIC DISCOVERY, supra note 33, at 31. Popper states: "The initial 
stage, the act of conceiving or inventing a theory, seems to me neither to call for logical 
analysis nor to be susceptible of it." Id. Consequently, every scientific idea contains an 
"irrational element" or "creative intuition" that is a matter of "psychology." Id. at 32. Peirce, 
of course, would disagree: he thought that an understanding of abduction was necessary for an 
understanding of science. Part of this disagreement springs from different uses of the word 
"rational." Popper hmits the term "rationality" to logical necessity. 
209 As indicated by the title of his essay The Bucket and the Searchlight: Two Theories of 
Knowledge, in POPPER, OBJECTIVE KNOWLEDGE, supra note 30, at 341, Popper used the 
metaphor of the searchlight to describe his theory of science as an active searching starting 
from a specific viewpoint, and contrasts it with the more common, but naive, "bucket theory," 
which sees the mind as a passive receptacle of facts. He states, "In science it is observation 
rather than perception which plays the decisive part. An observation is a perception, but one 
which is planned and prepared An observation is always preceded by a particular interest, 
a question, or a problenMn short, by something theoretical." Id. at 342 (citation omitted). 
Consequently, Popper concludes that "[t]he initial stage, the act of conceiving or inventing a 
theory, seems to me neither to call for logical analysis nor to be susceptible of it." POPPER, 
SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY, supra note 33, at 31. The origins of scientific theories contain an 
"irrational element" or "creative intuition" and are matters of "psychology." Id. at 31-32. 
210 He states that "[t]he question how it happens that a new idea occurs to a man... is 
irrelevant to the logical analysis of scientific knowledge." POPPER, SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY, 
supra note 33, at 31. 
211 Popper says that the origins of a scientific theory are irrelevant, because once 
formulated, the theory is then "submitted... to logical examination." Id. at 31. The scientist 
engages in "subsequent tests" that will determine whether "the inspiration may be discovered 
to be a discovery, or become known to be knowledge." Id. 
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external to human thought.^^^ Popper agreed with theorists as 
diverse as Kant, Peirce, and Lacan that we humans have no direct 
access to this "thing-in-itself' because our knowledge is always 
mediated by our thoughts and perceptions. He called our subjective 
experience of reality the second world.^" Nevertheless, Popper did 
not think that each of us is condemned to the ignorance of our 
individual, idiosyncratic second worlds. Rather, he believed that, by 
adopting an appropriate methodology, a community could come to 
an intersubjective consensus, which he called the third world.^" 
Popper sought to identify a logical methodology distinguishable 
from and more reliable than "common sense" that could lead to the 
favored consensus of science. 
Popper sometimes suggested that the third world—the 
consensus reached by science—could eventually approach a true 
understanding of the first, or object, world.^" By proper apphcation 
of the scientific method of falsification the community of scientists 
could weed out the bad hypotheses and arrive at a consensus as to 
which remaining hypotheses seemed promising for future testing.^^® 
In Popper's terminology, these consensus theses were "objective," 
but only in the sense of being reached by intersubjective 
212 See POPPER, OBJECTIVE KNOWLEDGE, supra note 30, at 106 ("[W]e may distinguish 
the following three words or universes: first, the world of physical objects or of physical 
states "). 
213 In Popper's words, this is "the world of states of consciousness, or mental states, or 
perhaps of behavioral dispositions to act." Id. 
214 This is "the world of objective contents of thought, especially of scientific and poetic 
thoughts and of works of art." Id. 
215 Although Popper argued that the intersubjective third world did not have direct access 
to the objective first world, he also thought that the subjective second world formed an 
indirect link between them. See id. at 155-56. Note that although Popper insists on 
characterizing his third world as "objective," see id. at 108-09, he is using the word in the sense 
that I have called "Community Objectivity," or intersubjective consensus. See Schroeder, 
Subject: Object, supra note 29, at 17-28. Intersubjective consensus is objective only in the 
sense that it is independent of the idiosyncratic subjectivity of any specific member of the 
community who creates the consensus, not in the sense that it relates to direct access to the 
external "object" world. In this sense, scientific knowledge is subjectless, as indicated by the 
title of Popper's essay Epistemology Without a Knowing Subject. See POPPER, OBJECTIVE 
KNOWLEDGE, supra note 30, at 106. 
216 Although Popper recognized the "irrational" moment of theory creation, he argued that 
this was irrelevant because the methodology of falsification would weed out any purely 
idiosyncratic theory, leaving only those that are "objective" in the sense of being the subject of 
intersubjective consensus. See POPPER, SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY, supra note 33, at 31; Karl R. 
Popper, Normal Science and Its Dangers, in CRITICISM AND THE GROWTH OF KNOWLEDGE, 
supra note 127, at 51,57; see also Schroeder, Abduction, supra note 33, at 163-64. 
Note that, from a Popperian standpoint, scientific theories are '"value free' or 
aperspectival... in the sense that they are not dependent on the idiosyncratically held 
opinions or the viewpoint of any one member of the community but are chosen by, and shared 
within, the community." Schroeder, Subject: Object, supra note 29, at 20. 
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agreement.'" We have no direct way of knowing whether a thesis is 
"objectively" true in the sense of being absolutely and universally 
true—because we do not have access to the mind of God. In 
Kantian terms, as phenomenal creatures we cannot know the 
noumenon (the thing-in-itself). 
Popper describes his notion of science as a search for 
"verisimilitude" rather than "truth."'^® This does not imply, 
however, that Popper is indifferent to the truth claims of theory in 
the way that Friedman and Posner are. Rather, Popper's distinction 
rests on a very exalted definition of truth, coupled with a modest 
assessment of human limitations. By "truth" Popper means the set 
of all true statements"—that is, perfect knowledge of the object 
world with absolutely no omissions—which, he admits, is an 
"unattainable target set.'"'® Only God Himself would be capable of 
such absolute knowledge. Consequently, Popper seeks a clearer 
and a more realistic aim than the search for the truth understood 
in this universal sense. The goal of verisimilitude is a corollary to the 
Popperian principle that scientific hypotheses, hke all human 
knowledge, are always fallible and corrigible and, therefore, always 
"false" to some degree. Consequently, he accepts the fact that 
"theories retain their interest even if we have reason to believe that 
they are false.""' But, once again, this is not, as Friedman and 
Posner argue, because the only test of theory is prediction. Instead, 
Popper thinks that a good theory is an "approximation""' of the 
truth, and that the apphcation of scientific methodology can make 
theories into more and more accurate approximations: 
I intend to show that while we can never have sufficiently good 
arguments in the empirical sciences for claiming that we have 
actually reached the truth, we can have strong and reasonably 
good arguments for claiming that we may have made progress 
towards the truth; that is, that the theory E is preferable to its 
predecessor T„ at least in the light of all known rational 
arguments. 
Moreover, we can explain the method of science, and 
much of the history of science, as the rational procedure for 
getting nearer to the truth.'" 
217 See POPPER, SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY, supra note 33, at 44; Schroeder, Subject: Object, 
supra note 29, at 17-24. 




222 He states, "Newton never believed that his theory was really the last word, and Einstein 
never believed that his theory was more than a good approximation to the true theoiy^he 
unified field theory which he searched for —" Id. 
223 Id. at 57-58 (emphases added). 
2001] JUST SO STORIES: POSNERIAN METHODOLOGY 403 
Consequently, as Luban has suggested,Posner's self-
proclaimed pragmatism with its, at best, agnostic view toward the 
truth of theories seems at odds with his stated allegiance to the 
scientific methodology of falsification, which sees truth as the 
asymptote that scientific theory as verisimilitude approaches, but 
never reaches. 
Once again, I am not arguing that the Popperian notion of 
science as falsification is itself unproblematic. One nagging problem 
with Popper's confidence that science can weed out bad initial 
assmnptions (making them "irrelevant") should be obvious. 
Because falsification can only work negatively and all scientific 
theories remain fallible and corrigible, we can never know when or if 
all bad assumptions have been eliminated. Although Popper hoped 
that the third world of scientific, intersubjective consensus could 
approach correspondence with the first world of "objective" reality, 
he understood "that it is not possible to move from a logical 
conclusion to a statement about the real [i.e., first] world."'^^ In 
other words, even though Popper thought that falsification "would 
continue the progress of knowledge," the conclusion "that there was 
any progress at all must finally be a matter of faith."^^® 
Consequently, there would seem to be considerable advantages 
if we could determine somehow what type of assumptions are more 
or less likely to prove fruitful before embarking on the arduous and 
unending process of falsification. It might be possible through the 
study of human thought and behavior to identify systematic 
prejudices that color our thought processes, which might make us 
suspicious of certain types of hypotheses and favorably disposed 
toward others. 
3. Abduction 
Charles Sanders Peirce, the great philosopher of science and 
cofounder of pragmatism, tried to give greater rigor to our 
understanding of the process of determining which assumptions are 
likely to prove fruitful for inquiry. Following Aristotle, he called this 
process "abduction" or "retroduction."^^^ In contrast to Popper, who 
only includes deduction and induction in his definition of logic, 
Peirce insisted that abduction is "a form of logic equal to the other 
224 See Luban, supra note 28, at 1005. 
225 Mansfield, supra note 194, at 11. 
226 Id. at 12. 
227 1 CHARLES S. PEIRCE, Lessons from the History of Science, in COLLECTED PAPERS, 
supra note 202, at 28; see also RICHARD TURSMAN, PEIRCE'S THEORY OF SCIENTIFIC 
DISCOVERY 13 (1987); Schroeder, Abduction, supra note 33, at 115-17. 
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forms and absolutely crucial to the growth of knowledge.In 
other words, to a Peircean, initial assumptions are neither irrelevant 
nor can they be dismissed as unreal, but are at the heart of scientific 
methodology. 
Abduction is a retroactive attempt to account for a past 
observation. It is post hoc explanation. Abduction may be 
described as follows: I observe a surprising thing (i.e., something that 
is different from my expectations, or an empirical datum that seems 
anomalous to the result predicted through application of my hard­
core theory). I then try to use my imagination to formulate an 
account that would explain the surprising thing.^^' By explanation, 
Peirce means: Fact X seems surprising, but if such and such were 
true, then the fact of X would no longer be surprising, but would 
seem to be a matter of course.^^° 
Peirce describes the difference between the three forms of logic 
as follows: "Deduction proves that something must be [i.e., 
necessity]; Induction shows that something actually is operative [i.e., 
actuality]; Abduction merely suggests that something may be [i.e., 
possibility].As Nancy Harrowits explains, "Abduction is a theory 
developed to explain a pre-existing fact."^^^ 
In normal English, abduction is intelligent guessing."^ 
One of Peirce's important points, however, is that abduction 
alone is merely the generation of potential hypotheses, not a form of 
scientific proof or even demonstration.^^" In my example, the fact 
that X exists standing alone does not prove or even give us reason to 
228 Schroeder, Abduction, supra note 33, at 119; see also TURSMAN, supra note 227, at 81; 
Paul Weiss, Charles S. Peirce, Philosopher, in PERSPECTIVES ON PEIRCE: CRITICAL ESSAYS 
ON CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE 120,125 (Richard J. Bernstein ed., 1965). 
229 See 2 PEIRCE, supra note 202, at 374; Thomas A. Sebeok, One, Two, Three Spells 
UBERTY, in THE SIGN OF THREE: DUPIN, HOLMES, PEIRCE 1,8 (Umberto Eco & Thomas A. 
Sebeok eds., 1983) [hereinafter THE SIGN OF THREE]; Schroeder, Abduction, supra note 33, at 
179-81; see also NORWOOD R. HANSON, PATTERNS OF DISCOVERY: AN INQUIRY INTO THE 
CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS OF SCIENCE 85 (1958). 
230 See CHARLES S. PEIRCE, PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF PEIRCE 151 (Justus Buchler 
ed., 1985); see also Umberto Eco, Horns, Hooves and Insteps: Some Hypotheses on Three 
Types of Abduction, in THE SIGN OF THREE, supra note 229, at 198, 203-04; Schroeder, 
Abduction, supra note 33, at 179 n.216. 
231 5 CHARLES S. PEIRCE, Three Types of Reasoning, in COLLECTED PAPERS, supra note 
202, at 106. 
232 Nancy Harrowits, The Body of the Detective Model Charles S. Peirce and Edgar Allan 
Poe, in THE SIGN OF THREE, supra note 229, at 182. 
Peirce's example of an inductive syllogism is: 
Rule.—All the beans from this bag are white. 
Result.—These beans are white. 
.-.Case.-These beans are from this bag. 
2 PHlRCE, supra note 202, at 374. 
233 As I have called it elsewhere. See Schroeder, Abduction, supra note 33, at 180. 
234 See id. at 183-84. 
2001] JUST SO STORIES: POSNERIAN METHODOLOGY 405 
think that such and such is in fact true. Abduction is the spinning of 
a good yam. It is the telling of just so stories. An abduction that 
seems plausible, given what other things we know or believe about 
the world, does, however, constitute a reason for us to further 
investigate whether such and such is true. To quote Umberto Eco, a 
theorist of abduction, we need a way of "deciding as to whether the 
possible universe outlined by our first-level abductions is the same as 
the universe of our experience. 
Elsewhere, I have suggested that theorists of abduction have 
offered at least three general ways of moving from abduction to 
proof. The first would be some form of "logical" or "reasoned" 
method."^ As I have already discussed, the Popperian tradition says 
that we can never, in fact, verify whether or not the new hypothesis 
is true, but we can develop a research program in an attempt to 
falsify the new hypothesis. That does not mean that we may not 
have "good reasons" to either logically or intuitively choose one 
abducted hypothesis over the other. Obviously, a hypothesis that is 
consistent with other facts and theories that the scientist already 
accepts has a competitive advantage over others. For example, even 
though I enjoy the X-Files, I would not favor an abducted hypothesis 
suggesting that the reason why so many people behave in ways that 
seem economically irrational is that they have been abducted by 
aliens. 
This is why we are not tempted to try to test the hypotheses 
presented in Kipling's Just So Stories: even though they would 
explain certain surprising facts if they were true. Given what we 
know about the world, they are simply not plausible explanations. 
Indeed, their very absurdity labels them as fantasy and makes them 
amusing. On the other hand, some brilliant abductions have been 
accepted by the scientific community despite the fact that they 
initi^ly seemed to have been widely diverse from accepted 
knowledge (think, for example of the principles of quantmn 
mechanics). 
A second possible way of "proving" a hypothesis is through 
some "nonscientific," "nonlogical," or "irrational" method such as 
by reference to taste, aesthetics, morality, politics, or faith."' By 
definition, theories of "science" (as opposed to theology or 
235 Eco, supra note 230, at 207. 
236 See Schroeder, Abduction, supra note 33, at 183. 
237 See id. Note, I am not using the word "irrationality" in the negative sense of being 
insane, nor do I mean to imply that irrationality is necessarily somehow inferior to rationality. 
Many very sophisticated thinkers believe that, ultimately, religious faith is the only sure path 
to truth. 
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philosophies of morality or aesthetics) have little to say about such 
methods. 
A third approach, one that is occasionally adopted by Peirce 
and Hegel, may be called a philosophical theory of 
"metaabduction."^^® This posits that there might be reason to believe 
that man has some inherent ability to make good abductions (guess 
correctly) about the object world.^^' A full discussion of Peirce's 
theory (which is remarkably similars to Hegel's) is beyond the scope 
of this Article. But, to oversimplify, it is based on the proposition 
that if we can assume that the human mind participates in universal 
reality, then there might also be reason to suppose that studying 
human consciousness might give us knowledge of the universe as 
well. In Tursman's words: 
If nature and thought are parts of the same system, then it may 
well be the case that whatever constraints apply to the system of 
thought apply as well to the system of nature. Or, to put it 
another way, our main goal is to discover whatever constraints 
obtain on the one system of thought and nature, and if the only 
way we can observe these constraints on the entire system is by 
observing the constraints on thought, then that hypothesis is 
worth pursuing.^'"' 
As described by Eco, metaabduction requires that one have "the 
courage of challenging without further tests the basic fallibilism that 
governs human knowledge."^"' 
Peirce and Hegel suggest that metaabduction could only work 
at the highest level of abstraction—they would never suggest that we 
can rely on our abductions about most scientific theories, let alone 
everyday decisions.^"^ Most actual abductions have aU the 
independent reliability of just so stories. Consequently, some form 
of pragmatic reasoning is always a necessary complement to 
dialectical reasoning. 
As we shall see, Posner, however, merely engages in this first 
step of abduction, but never proposes a research program. As 
discussed earlier, falsification consists of speculating about what as 
yet unobserved phenomena would be inconsistent with one's 
hypothesis, and then attempting through controlled observation to 
238 Eco coined "the term 'meta-abduction' to describe the process of moving from a 'first-
level' abductive hypothesis to the conclusion that the hypothesis is true" (that is, "true" in the 
sense of matching our experience of the world). Schroeder, Abduction, supra note 33, at 183 
n.234; see also Eco, supra note 230, at 207. 
239 See Schroeder, Abduction, supra note 33, at 184. 
240 TURSMAN, supra note 227, at 115. 
241 Eco, supra note 230, at 220. 
242 See 1 CHARLES S. PEIRCE, Fallibilism, Continuity, and Evolution, in COLLECTED 
PAPERS, supra note 202, at 70-71; Eco, supra note 230, at 218; Schroeder, Abduction, supra 
note 33, at 185. 
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identify the empirical existence of such phenomena. This is the 
opposite of the methodology that Posner in fact adopts— 
verification—in which one speculates as to what as-yet unobserved 
phenomena would be consistent with the hypothesis and then 
hvmting for such verifying phenomena. 
4. Sophisticated Falsification 
Imre Lakatos reworked Popper's methodology to develop what 
I will call "sophisticated" falsification. The problem with the simple 
statement of falsification given above—that a hypothesis is falsified if 
scientists observe data inconsistent with the predictions of the 
hypothesis—should be obvious. No actual hypothesis could ever 
withstand such strict scrutiny in the messy empirical world. We can 
always expect to observe some data that at least seems at first blush 
inconsistent with any theory. Friedman and Posner might be trying 
to capture this idea in their odd assertion that the assumptions 
underlying theories are "unrealistic" in the sense of simplified and 
abstract. 
Popper recognizes this problem in part when he insists that 
falsification requires more than the mere observation of 
inconsistencies. Rather, these inconsistencies must be consistently 
observed in reproducible, controlled observations. This only partly 
solves Popper's problems. 
As Friedman correctly suggests,^"^ insofar as all theories are, by 
necessity, abstractions, it is to be expected that empirical 
observations will in most (or all) cases deviate from predicted results 
to some degree. Consequently, a "sophisticated" falsification 
methodology must distinguish between those deviations that falsify a 
theory and those that do not. 
Popper's student, Kuhn, famously argued that the implication of 
Popper's theory was that there can be no single scientific method for 
testing hypotheses (or in his terminology, for rejecting an existing 
scientific paradigm and adopting a new revolutionary paradigm) 
because methodology itself is always internal to a paradigm or 
hypothesis.^"" That is, a scientist may very well have "good reasons" 
like "accuracy, scope, simplicity, fruitfolness, and the Uke" for 
shifting paradigms, but never logically necessary ones.^"' 
Falsification, therefore, is only a methodology that can be used in 
refining the details of a specific existing hypothesis (paradigm), but 
243 See infra text accompanying notes 86-88. PoSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 
16, at 18 ("But abstraction is of the essence of scientific inquiry, and economics aspires to be 
scientific."). 
244 See Schroeder, Abduction, supra note 33, at 165-67. 
245 See Kuhn, Reflections, supra note 127, at 261. 
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not to reject it as a whole. Kuhn damned the methodology of 
f a l s i f i c a t i o n  w i t h  f a i n t  p r a i s e  b y  l a b e l i n g  i t  " n o r m a l  s c i e n c e , t o  b e  
distinguished from "revolutionary science" that rejects hypotheses 
(i.e., shifts paradigms).As mentioned above, despite Friedman's 
claims that he adopts the methodology of falsification, he agrees with 
Kuhn that, when it comes to deciding between hypotheses, "men can 
ultimately only fight";^''^ and suggests, like Kuhn, that "relevant 
considerations" might include "simphcity" and "fruitfulness."^"® 
Lakatos's project was to reformulate Popper's methodology in 
hght of Kuhn's powerful critique. Lakatos agreed with both Popper 
and Kuhn that scientists do not (and should not) reject a hypothesis 
merely because of the observation of apparently inconsistent data. 
He states, "Contrary to naive falsificationism, no 
experiment... alone can lead to falsification. There is no falsification 
before the emergence of a better theory.Rather, the scientist 
should first identify the "hard core" or theoretically necessary kernel 
of her theory that can form the basis of a "scientific research 
program"—Lakatos's more modest term for a Kuhnian paradigm. 
The scientist then engages in controlled observation (through 
experiments or otherwise) in order to identify empirical data 
inconsistent with the hypothesis. 
When inconsistencies are observed, the theorist does not 
immediately reject the theory. Rather, she tries to develop 
"auxiliary" hypotheses that both explain away the apparent anomaly 
while remaining consistent with the hard core to serve as a 
246 Kuhn discusses his concept of normal science extensively. See, e.g., THOMAS S. KUHN, 
THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 23-51 (2d ed. 1970) [hereinafter KUHN, 
SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS]; Kuhn, Reflections, supra note 127, at 246-47,250. 
247 KUHN, SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS, supra note 246, at 6,92. 
248 FRIEDMAN, supra note 12, at 5; see also Martha Nussbaum, Skepticism About Practical 
Reason in Literature and the Law, 107 HARV. L. REV. 714,728 (1994). 
249 FRIEDMAN, supra note 12, at 10. 
250 Imre Lakatos, Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes, in 
CRITICISM AND THE GROWTH OF KNOWLEDGE, supra note 127, at 91, 119 (citations 
omitted). 
25t See BLAUG, supra note 18, at 34. In Blaug's words: 
[Lakatos divides a scientific research program] into rigid and flexible parts 
Lakatos observes ... "all scientific research programmes may be characterized 
by their 'hard core', surrounded by a protective belt of auxiliary hypotheses 
which has to bear the brunt of tests." The hard core is treated as irrefutable by 
"the methodological decision of its protagonists" The protective belt 
contains the flexible parts of [a scientific research program], and it is here that 
the hard core is combined with auxiliary assumptions to form the specific 
testable theories with which the [scientific research program] earns its scientific 
reputation. 
Id. (quoting IMRE LAKATOS, THE METHODOLOGY OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH 
PROGRAMMES (John Worrall & Gregory Currie eds., 1978)). 
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"protective belt" buffering the core.^'^ Most of what Kuhn calls 
"normal science" would fall within the development of this 
protective belt. Although to my knowledge Lakatos does not use 
the term, these auxiliaries are developed through abduction—they 
are stories that make what was initially surprising (anomalous 
observations) seem a matter of course. Consequently, since 
abduction is not proof, the scientist cannot stop when she formulates 
her auxiharies. The research program requires that she now try to 
falsify her auxiliaries (which are now part of her hypothesis). If this 
leads to the observation of new data anomalous with the auxiliaries, 
the scientist then develops auxiharies to her auxiliaries and repeats 
the process, which could theoretically continue ad infinitum. 
One of the most interesting aspects of Lakatos's methodology is 
that he seeks to develop a "logical" criteria for shifting paradigms by 
identifying how a research program degenerates over time. This 
happens when the hard core becomes too encrusted with an 
increasingly broad protective belt of ad hoc auxiharies.^^^ In other 
words, when a research program starts degenerating, the hard core 
of the theory starts explaining less, rather than more, about the 
world as the majority of the theory becomes excuses for why the 
theory does not work in more and more circumstances. 
Surprisingly, however, Lakatos does not suggest that a scientist 
should reject a research program merely because it is degenerating. 
Rather he maintains that the scientist has no choice but to stick with 
her hard core until she is able to formulate an alternative hypothesis 
that has "excess empirical content.That is, she must formulate a 
new hard core that explains more of the observed empirical data 
than the degenerated hard core of the old research program.^" 
The classic example is the replacement of the Ptolemaic theory 
of the solar system with the Copemican (and the replacement of the 
Copemican with the Keplerian). As is well known, the Ptolemaic 
252 Lakatos, supra note 250, at 132-38. 
253 In Blaug's words, a scientific research project degenerates if it "is characterized by the 
endless addition of ad hoc adjustments that merely accommodate whatever new facts become 
available " BLAUG, supra note 18, at 33; see also Schroeder, Abduction, supra note 33, at 
169-70. 
254 Lakatos, supra note 250, at 118. 
255 Critics, such as Kuhn himself and Paul Feyerabend, challenge Lakatos's proposition 
that excess empirical content constitutes the single "scientific" test for adopting a 
"revolutionary" research program (paradigm) as either a theoretical or empirical matter. 
Quine argues that all attempts to formulate a coherent theory of falsification are doomed 
since the adoption of auxiliary hypotheses is always to some extent ad hoc. Feyerabend goes a 
step further and contends that in practice actual scientific methodology is "anything goes." 
See supra note 196. I discuss the development of falsification methodology extensively in 
Schroeder, Abduction, supra note 33, at 161-71. 
As I discuss throughout this Article, it is standard practice for economists to accuse their 
critics of ad hocery, while ignoring their own. 
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theory postulated that the planets (including the sun and moon) all 
moved in perfect circles around the earth. When astronomers 
observed that planetary movement deviated from the predictions, 
they formulated the auxiliary of epicycles—the planets moved in 
perfect circles within perfect circles. When additional anomalies 
were observed more and more levels of epicycles were added. 
Although the astronomers were able to account for most of the 
movement they observed by multiplication of epicycles, this was at 
the expense of causing their reseeu-ch program to degenerate. The 
hard core (the planets moved in a circular orbit around the sun) 
explained less and less of planetary movement. Copernican theory 
was adopted because its hard core—^the planets (other than the 
Moon) moved in perfect circles around the sun—explained more of 
the observed movement of the planets than the hard core of the 
Ptolemaic. Soon after this, however, anomalies to the Copernican 
hard core were observed that required auxiharies. Consequently, 
the Copernican theory started degenerating and was very quickly 
replaced with the Keplerian hard core that planets (other than the 
Moon) moved in elliptical, rather than circular, orbits around the 
vi sun. 
f:ii » C. Posner's Methodology in Practice 
"fi Although Posner claims to adopt a Friedmanesque 
methodology based on validation through prediction, he does not 
practice what he preaches. 
1. Assumptions v. Predictions 
The Friedman-Posner methodology is based on the distinction 
between the assumptions underlying a theory and the predictions (or 
implications) generated by the assumptions. As discussed above, 
some of Friedman's critics have charged that his methodology is 
flawed precisely because he adopts the unsophisticated position that 
one can easily distinguish between assumptions and predictions and 
does not offer precise definitions of his terms. If Friedman's attempt 
to distinguish between assumptions and predictions is problematic in 
theory, Posner's is so in application. One can argue that Posner 
often labels as untestable assumptions of economic theory that are, 
in fact, at least partially predictions and should, by his own 
methodology, be tested. As Blaug points out, this is a sin frequently 
made by Friedman as well. 
The basic assumption of economics that Friedman and Posner 
discuss is economic rationality—in the marketplace, consumers will 
act so as to maximize their utility and producers will act so as to 
maximize their profits. Friedman, and Posner, argue that this 
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assumption should be maintained regardless of its realism or truth 
because it has been shown to be a good predictor of market 
behavior. 
Nevertheless, for all his talk about prediction, falsification, and 
testing, Friedman's argument in favor of the rationality postulate is 
notoriously lacking in empirical support. For example, Friedman 
claims that the "maximization of returns" hypothesis is supported by 
"an important body of evidence" culled from "countless applications 
of the hypothesis to specific problems and the repeated failure of its 
implications to be contradicted."^'® Blaug rightfully describes this as 
"without doubt the most frustrating passage in Friedman's entire 
essay because it is unaccompanied by even a single instance of these 
'countless applications.'"^'"' Friedman's defense that the "evidence is 
extremely hard to document [because] it is scattered"^'® seems half­
hearted, at best. 
According to Nobelist Gary Becker, however, when economists 
speak of the predictive power of the rationality postulate they 
usually have in mind the prediction of downward-sloping demand 
curves and upward-sloping supply curves.^" Despite years of 
theoretical speculation and empirical research trying to identify 
meaningful exceptions to these phenomena the observations remains 
extremely robust.^®" That is, no economist has convincingly proven 
the existence of the phenomenon—"giffen goods," or goods with 
such snob appeal that demand actually increases with price—that 
would seemingly contradict (and potentially falsify) this prediction.^®^ 
256 FRIEDMAN, supra note 12, at 22. 
257 BLAUG, supra note 18, at 101. 
258 FRIEDMAN, supra note 12, at 22. 
259 Becker claims to show "that negatively inclined market demand curves result not so 
much from rational behavior per se as from a general principle which includes a wide class of 
irrational behavior as well." GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN 
BEHAVIOR 156 (1976) [hereinafter BECKER, ECONOMIC APPROACH]. Becker states: "Not 
only utility maximization but also many other decision rules, incorporating a wide variety of 
irrational behavior, lead to negatively inclined demand curves because of the effect of a 
change in prices on opportunities." Id. at 158 (citation omitted). 
260 See id. at 156. Becker rhetorically asks, "How can these extensive criticisms [i.e., of the 
rationality postulate] be reconciled with the fact that the main implication of utility 
theory—that market demand curves would be negatively inclined—has been consistently 
verified empirically and found extremely useful in practical problems?" Id. 
261 See GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE 23 (4th ed. 1987). As Stigler 
notes: 
How can we convince a skeptic that this "law of demand" is really true of all 
consumers, all times, all commodities? ... Perhaps as persuasive a proof as is 
readily summarized is this: If an economist were to demonstrate its failure in a 
particular market at a particular time, he would be assured of immortality, 
professionally speaking, and rapid promotion while still alive. Since most 
economists would not dislike either reward, we may assume that the total 
absence of exceptions is not from lack of trying to find them. 
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And yet, Becker suggests, this is not necessarily a justification for 
continued reliance on the assumption of economic rationality. 
Becker shows that the phenomenon of downward-sloping demand 
curves does not require the assumption of economic rationality and 
is consistent with any number of other less controversial 
assumptions.^® 
In a footnote,^® Posner acknowledges Becker's analysis but 
seems to miss the point. Posner correctly states that Becker does not 
argue that downward-sloping demand curves are inconsistent with 
the rationality postulate or that most consumers are not in fact 
rational.^® I read Becker's point, however, to be that insofar as 
economists like Posner have traditionally tried to defend the 
hypothesis that individuals are economically rational (despite 
empirical evidence to the contrary), on the grounds that it accurately 
predicts downward-sloping demand curves, this defense is weak 
because other aspects of neoclassical economic theory can predict 
the same result.'® In Becker's words, the observation that markets 
act as if they were rational does not require the more controversial 
hypothesis that individual market participants are themselves 
rational actors.'® That is, the assumption of the rationality postulate 
arguably adds nothing to this analysis. Consequently, one cannot 
rely on the prediction and observation of downward-sloping demand 
curves as a justification for the rationality postulate.'® 
Id. at 22-23 (citation omitted). Later Stigler states: "There is some evidenee that this 'Giffen 
case'... never existed and none at all that it did." Id. at 57-59. 
When I was a young lawyer, I had an acquaintance who worked for a law firm 
representing Cuisinart in a federal antitrust enforcement action charging Uleg^ retail pnce 
maintenance. The defense that he was assigned to work on was that Cuismart's action was 
justified on the grounds that the Cuisinart (which was at that time the only food prc^ssor sold 
to the home chef) was a rare giffen good. Unfortunately, I lost track of this acquaintance and 
do not know what happened to this argument. 
262 See BECKER, ECONOMIC APPROACH, supra note 259, at 161 ("Hence the market 
would act as if 'it' were rational [i.e., demand curves would be negatively inclined] not only 
when households were rational, but also when they were inert, impulsive, or otherwise 
irrational."). 
263 See Posner, Behavioral Economics, supra note 6, at 1556 n.11. 
264 See id. . , r. • c i n • „r 
265 JST make a similar criticism of Posner's interpretation of Becker. 5ee J oils et ai.. 
Theories and Tropes, supra note 14, at 1598-99. 
266 See supra note 260. • t r tu 
267 Becker is a neoclassieal economist who does, of course, adopt his own vanant ot tne 
rationality postulate, but does not seek to justify it by predicting demand curves. Rather, he 
claims that his "new home economics" is a falsifiable theory that can be tested tteough 
analysis of a variety of economie phenomena. Despite these claims, as Blaug notes, Becker 
commits the usual economist's sin of confusing falsification and verification: that is, he tries to 
predict and observe behavior that is eonsistent with his theory, rather than inconsistent. See 
BLAUG, supra note 18, at 226; Schroeder, Economic Rationality, supra note 8. 
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Friedman himself notoriously violates his principle that a 
scientific theory must specify "the circmnstances for which [it] 
holds."^®^ As Blaug points out: 
[H]aving introduced this important methodological 
clarification, Friedman immediately spoils the point by allowing 
the theory of perfect competition to apply to any firm 
whatsoever, depending on circumstances: "there is no 
inconsistency in regarding the same firm as if it were a perfect 
competitor for one problem and a monopolist for another."^®' 
This problem is even greater in Posner's analysis than in 
traditional economics. He takes the empirically questionable 
assumption of economic rationality—which is not needed to explain 
the fundamental economic phenomenon of downward-sloping 
demand curves and is a poor predictor of other behavior—and 
applies it to any number of legal and social problems."" As is well 
known, Posner takes this assumption of economic rationality and 
uses it to predict a wide variety of behavior, but in doing so, blurs the 
lines between assumptions and predictions. Specifically, the 
assumption of economic behavior was originally adopted in order to 
explain observed behavior in explicit markets. The next step, 
however, is to assert that consumers are economically rational not 
only in express markets, but in implicit markets as well. Is this a 
prediction, a new assmnption, or an extension of the old 
assumption? 
Some of Posner's language suggests the former. He concludes 
from the hypothesis that people act economically rational in market 
contexts, that we should expect them to act economically rational in 
other situations."^ This could be read as suggesting that we predict 
from the observation of economically rational behavior in markets 
that people will act economically rational elsewhere. If this is a 
prediction, then by Posner's own methodology he should not accept 
this prediction but test it. 
If it is not a prediction, but just an extension of the original 
assmnption, then he needs to make new predictions to test through 
falsification. Posner's claims that he does this ring hollow. 
268 FRIEDMAN, IWPRA, note 12, at 19. 
269 BLAUG, supra note 18, at 93 (quoting FRIEDMAN, supra note 12, at 36). 
270 For example, he states: "The basic assumption of economics... is instrumental 
rationality: the individual chooses the means that are most suitable ... to his ends The 
choice of means need not be and often is not conscious There is... no paradox in 
supposing that sexual behavior... may fruitfully be modeled as rational." POSNER, 
OVERCOMING LAW, supra note 5, at 553. 
271 See id. ("Since emotion and reason are not necessarily antagonistic, there is also no 
paradox in supposing that sexual behavior, despite the intense emotions that precede and 
accompany it, may fruitfully be modeled as rational.") 





2. Abduction v. Induction (Falsification) 
As I discuss in Economic Rationality,^''^ JST point out some facts 
that seem surprising under the neoclassical rationality postulate—for 
example, that people value the seemingly altruistic concept of 
fairness, or that people routinely make the sunk-cost fallacy. Posner 
then spins a yarn: Once upon a time, about five million years ago, 
maybe men lived in groups like such and such, and maybe their goals 
were such and such, and maybe it might make sense to do such and 
such based on this—^and concludes that if this story that I just made 
up were true, then JST's facts would no longer look surprising. He 
suggests that "[w]e need only imagine the kind of cognitive 
equipment that would be optimal in the prehistoric environment to 
which early man adapted 
In other words, Posner's methodology is remarkably like the 
one adopted by Rudyard Kipling when he wrote his Just So Stories. 
Three of these. How the First Letter Was Written, How the Alphabet 
Was Made, and The Cat that Walked by Himself, hypothesize about 
the origins of two fundamental bases of civilization—written 
language and the domestication of animals. In each story he 
purports to imagine what life might have been like for the earliest 
human families living millions of years ago. The result is delightfully 
amusing precisely because Kipling never meant for anyone to take 
his fables to be an accurate account of primitive society—his Cro-
Magnons are immediately recognizable as a proper middle-class 
Edwardian family who just happens to live in a cave and wear animal 
skins. 
In contrast, Posner offers his flights of fancy as descriptions of 
what our ancestors might actually have been like and offers these 
descriptions as an explanation of modem behavior. Despite his 
stated commitment to falsification, Posner does not, however, even 
suggest that he now has the responsibility of demonstrating how this 
fanciful story of his could be falsified. At most, he offers some 
speculation as to how it could be verified. 
Posner asserts, for example, that he was able to use 
evolutionary biology "to predict [more accurately] than behavioral 
economics as conceived by JST" such phenomena as "fairness," 
"cognitive quirks," and "weakness of will.""" In fact, Posner does no 
such thing. He does not start with the theory of evolutionary 
biology, predict certain forms of behavior, and then look for 
empirical data that would either falsify or be consistent with his 
272 Schroeder, Economic Rationality, supra note 8. 
273 Posner, Behavioral Economics, supra note 6, at 1570. 
274 Id. At this stage, Posner does admit that the second two of this triad may not be 
predictable by traditional rational choice theory alone. See id. 
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predictions. Rather, he takes JST's data (which is surprising under 
traditional neoclassical rationality theory) and abducts that it might 
be consistent with some of the hypotheses of evolutionary biologieal 
theory. Posner's judgment that evolutionary theory has been 
successful in other areas may or may not be a "good reason" for 
Posner to think that his abduction will prove fruitful. It certainly is 
not, however, proof of the hypothesis abducted. Under Posner's 
own stated methodology, it is now that Posner needs to make further 
predictions of human behavior based on his abductions and engage 
in controlled observations (either of future or past behavior—social 
science research can be done by historical studies as well as forward-
looking ones) to try to falsify it. 
Instead, Posner vaguely refers to the fact that rational choice 
theory has been a good predictor in the past. But this is not a 
response to JST's assertion that they have made observations that 
not only were not predicted by the theory but also seem inconsistent 
with it. That is, behavioral eeonomists think that their evidence 
indicates precisely that the rationality postulate is a poor predictor of 
economic behavior. 
3. Verification v. Falsification 
Posner claims to be following the standard scientific 
methodology of falsification. In fact, an examination of his 
application of his methodology shows that he chooses "the easier 
option of verifieationism."^^^ In Blaug's words: 
[W]e begin with the available evidence about human behavior 
in areas traditionally neglected by economics and then 
congratulate ourselves that we have accounted for it by nothing 
more than the application of standard economic logic.... 
Moreover, we hail the economic approach as superior to any 
available alternative, but we restrict the scope of comparison to 
our own advantage and we never in fact specify the alternative 
approaches that we have in mind. Clearly, if these are the rules 
of the game, we simply cannot lose.^^® 
In other words, Posnerian theory exploits the rhetoric of scientific 
methodology without adhering to any of its substantive 
requirements. 
An excellent illustration of this is in the introductory, 
methodological section of Posner's perhaps most controversial book. 
Sex and ReasonE'' In this curious work, Posner purports to offer 
275 BLAUG, supra note 18, at 226. 
276 Id. In this passage, Blaug is speaking of Becker, another economist who claims to adopt 
the methodology of falsification yet actually applies that of verification. See id. 
277 POSNER, SEX AND REASON 1-12 (1992) [hereinafter POSNER, SEX AND REASON]. 
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economic explanations for, and make legal policy suggestions 
concerning, a wide variety of sexual laws, customs, and practices. 
Not surprisingly, as is so often the case, Posner's single-minded 
approach just happens to defend the status quo as being almost 
inevitable. This is probably the inevitable result of his flawed 
methodology. 
Before I go further, I must emphasize that I am not opposed to 
the proposition that economics can meaningfully add to our 
understanding of sexuality. Indeed, I have argued extensively 
elsewhere that Posner's intuition that sex and economics are linked 
is consistent with psychoanalytic theory, which holds that both are 
forms of eroticism."® This theory, however, suggests that Posner is 
incorrect in concluding that an analysis of sexuahty can be reduced 
to economics. Rather than sexuality being subsumed into 
economics, psychoanalysis suggests that markets are one of the 
simplest, most primitive forms of eroticism. This suggests that we 
might learn something about erotics by studying markets as its 
simple form, but that the entirety of complex forms of erotics such as 
sexuahty and love cannot be reduced to the simple model. If, as 
economists posit, actual markets are characterized by the 
maximization of enjoyment through instrumental ends-means 
reasoning, and if economic subjects respond to incentives and 
disincentives, then we might also expect to see similar behavior in 
the more obvious erotic relationships of sexuahty, as Posner 
suggests. However, psychoanalysis also posits that erotic subjects 
often engage both in economically "irrational" behavior calculated 
either to frustrate enjoyment or bring about pain and as well as in 
philosophically rational speculation designed to determine the 
proper ends to pursue, rather than the means to a preexisting end. 
Consequently, although some erotic behavior may be predictable, 
eroticism by its very nature contains moments of spontaneity 
inconsistent with Posnerian prediction. I discuss this at greater 
length in Economic Rationality. 
Posner states, conventionally, that if his economic analysis of 
sexuahty is to have scientific vahdity, then it must be able to be 
subjected to falsification. Posner, however, misstates what this test 
is. He states: "Another [test of a theory] is its power to generate 
counterintuitive (hence novel, nontrivial, nonobvious) hypotheses 
278 See JEANNE LORRAINE SCHROEDER, THE VESTAL AND THE FASCES: HEGEL, 
LACAN, PROPERTY, AND THE FEMININE (1998); Jeanne L. Schroeder, The Triumph of 
Venus: The Erotics of the Market (2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
279 Schroeder, Economic Rationality, supra note 8. 
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that can be tested empirically and that do not flunk the test. A 
number of such hypotheses are proposed in this book 
Posner is correct that a falsifiable theory is one that generates 
predictions of previously unobserved phenomenon. Posner suggests, 
however, that after making such predictions, the scientist then goes 
out into the world (or into the lab) and seeks to find examples of the 
predicted phenomena. This is the easier process of verification—the 
search for phenomena that are consistent with one's theory. 
Falsification, in contrast, consists of determining what 
previously unobserved phenomena, were it to exist, would be 
inconsistent with the hypothesis. The scientist must then try to 
devise a mode of controlled observation that would enable one to 
determine whether inconsistent phenomena exist. Under 
falsification, a hypothesis is never, of course, definitively proved but 
always remains both falhble and corrigible. Nevertheless, if after 
repeated attempts scientists fail to find inconsistent phenomena, 
then we are justified in remaining committed (if only conditionally 
so) to the theory as being not falsified. If, on the contrary, an 
apparently inconsistent phenomenon is in fact observed, then the 
scientist must determine whether his theory is thereby falsified or, 
imder the methodology of sophisticated falsification, whether the 
hard core of the theory can be protected by the addition of a 
protective belt of auxiliaries. Accordingly: 
A theory is to be called "empirical" or "falsifiable" if it divides 
the class of all possible basic statements unambiguously into the 
following two non-empty subclasses. First, the class of all those 
basic statements with which it is inconsistent (or which it rules 
out, or prohibits): we call this the class of the potential falsifiers 
of the theory; and secondly, the class of those basic statements 
which it does not contradict (or which it "permits").^®' 
In contrast, when Posner makes predictions, he only identifies the 
second class of statements that are consistent with the hypothesis. 
But, according to Popper, "[ajbout the 'permitted' basic statements 
[a scientific theory] says nothing. In particular, it does not say that 
they are true."^®^ In other words, the fact that a theory accurately 
predicts certain facts does not prove the theory. Although Posner 
claims that his theory is falsifiable, his examples do not demonstrate 
that it is. In Popper's words, "a theory is falsifiable if the class of its 
potential falsifiers is not empty. As I shall discuss shortly, the 
280 POSNER, SEX AND REASON, supra note 111, at 5-6. 
281 POPPER, SQENTIFIC DISCOVERY, supra note 33, at 86. 
282 Id. (citation omitted). 
283 Id. 
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class of statements that could potentially falsify Posner's theory of 
sex is indeed empty. 
It is not enough, as Posner imphes, that a theory be merely 
falsifiable. Identifying falsifiability is only the first step in testing a 
hypothesis. One must actually try to falsify it. A theory is falsified 
"only if we discover a reproducible effect refutes the theory."^®" 
The methodology of falsification is the search for such a refuting 
effect, not the search for a confirming one. In a passage that could 
have been written with Posner in mind. Popper states: 
The fundamental difference between my approach and the 
approach for which I long ago introduced the label "inductivist" 
is that I lay stress on negative arguments, such as negative 
instances or counter-examples, refutations, and attempted 
refutations—^in short, criticism—^while the inductivist lays stress 
on 'positive instances," from which he draws "non-
demonstrative inferences," and which he hopes will guarantee 
the "reliability" of the conclusions of these inferences.^®' 
He continues: 
In my view, all that can possibly be "positive" in our scientific 
knowledge is positive only in so far as certain theories are, at a 
certain moment of time, preferred to others in the light of our 
critical discussion which consists of attempted refutations, 
including empirical tests. Thus even what may be called 
"positive" is so only with respect to negative methods.^ 
Blaug explains the Popperian method thus: "[T]here is an 
asjmunetry between verification and falsification. From a strictly 
logical point of view, we can never assert that a hypothesis is 
necessarily true because it agrees with the facts In other 
words, in verification, one predicts and looks for data consistent with 
one's theory. In falsification, one predicts and looks for data 
inconsistent with one's theory. In verification, one feels satisfied 
when one finds consistent data. In falsification, one is merely 
temporarily and contingently encouraged by the failure to find 
inconsistent data. 
Consequently, Posner is incorrect to argue that his theory is 
falsifiable because it is consistent with certain facts that he predicts 
exist in the world. On the other hand, Blaug states, "we can deny 
the truth of a hypothesis with reference to the facts [T]here is 
no logic of proof but there is logic of disproof."^®® 
284 Id. 
285 POPPER, OBJECTIVE KNOWLEDGE, supra note 30, at 20. 
286 Id. 
287 BLAUG, supra note 18, at 15. 
288 Id. 
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I woiild suggest that the implicit reason why Posner applies the 
methodology of verification to his analysis of sexuahty (albeit 
incorrectly labeled as falsification) is that, in fact, his analysis is ad 
hoc and unfalsifiable.^®' Indeed, reading his analysis, I cannot 
imagine any sexual behavior that could not be explained through an 
abduction based on his starting "assumptions." 
In other words, Posner is guilty of the economist's sin of 
preaching falsification but practicing, at best, an "innocuous 
falsification"^'" designed not to challenge and test economic theory, 
but to protect it from attack. 
4. AIDS and Birthrates 
For example, in Sex and Reason, Posner, writing in 1992, 
predicted that the AIDS epidemic should result in a reduction in the 
rate of births to unmarried women.®^ This is because a rational cost-
benefit analysis would both encourage people to be less promiscuous 
and encourage people who do choose to have sex to use condoms in 
relatively "casual" sexual encounters (i.e., sexual relations with 
persons with whom one does not have a long sexual history or 
commitment, such as in marriage of other long-term, stable 
relationships).^'^ 
This prediction of less promiscuity and increased use of 
condoms is typical of the type of modest contributions economic 
analysis can make to our understanding of sexual behavior. But this 
contribution is modest precisely because this type of analysis is 
hardly new, or unique to economics.^'^ Indeed, sexual traditionalists 
have always argued that the harmful potential effects of nonmarital 
sexuahty (for example, through the free availabihty of 
contraception) should not be ameliorated precisely because they will 
289 See Hovenkamp, supra note 23, at 823-24. Hovenkamp suggests: 
O f t e n . . .  t h e  p o s i t i v i s t  e c o n o m i s t  r e l i e s  o n  t h e o r y  r a t h e r  t h a n  o b s e r v a t i o n  t o  
reach her conclusion about the economic effects of the legal rule. For example, 
no one has proved by rigorous attempts at falsification that the common law has 
tended toward efficiency Actual attempts at falsification play only a small 
part of economic positivism, even in easy cases. 
Id. 
290 BLAUG, supra note 18, at 111. 
291 See POSNER, SEX AND REASON, supra note 277, at 6,115. 
292 See id. 
293 As Leiter has accurately stated, the few predictions that economics does successfully 
make are mundane and banal, at best: "[S]urely we do not need economics—or any 
putative social science" to draw such simplistic, common-sense conclusions. Leiter, supra 
note 179, at 307 (citation omitted) (referring specifically, in this case, to "Posner's claim 
that 'an increase in the severity of punishment will (ceteris paribus) reduce the amount of 
crime'")-
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discourage promiscuity.^'^ It is the broader prediction that is 
^ What if in fact, the rate of nonmarital births increased, rather 
than decreased, during the height of the AIDS epidemic? Would 
this falsify Posner's economic analysis of sexuahty? Of course not. 
One could argue that the fear of AIDS encouraged people, 
rationally, to use condoms. Condoms, of course, have two distmct 
purposes: protection from disease and contraception. It people 
started using condoms for the first purpose (protection from 
disease), one might expect people also to use them for the latter 
(contraception). Consequently, women who start usmg condoms 
might also be expected to stop using other forms of contraception, 
such as diaphragms and birth control piUs. Since condoms are not as 
reliable a form of birth control as these other two forms, one might 
expect the birth rate to go up in this population of women. 
And lo and behold, Posner writmg m 1996 and 1999 makes 
precisely this alternative prediction that birth rates will f up and 
declares it a victory of rational choice theory over behavioral 
economics.''^ He does not mention his earlier prediction let alone 
explain why the data do not falsify his theory. 
In other words, under Posner's analysis, the existence of the 
AIDS epidemic is equally consistent with an increase or a decrease 
in the nonmarital birth rate. The result depends on conditions that 
are beyond the analysis—i.e., the relative number of women who 
before the epidemic used no contraception who have been 
encouraged to use condoms as compared to the number of women 
who before the epidemic were using another more effective form of 
contraception who have been encouraged to switch to condoms. 
In fact, out-of-wedlock births as a percentage of aU bnths 
increased throughout the eighties and early nineties-Ahe height of 
concern over the AIDS epidemic-and began decreasmg m the late 
nineties—after more successful treatments of AIDS with protease 
inhibitors were introduced.^'® No doubt this neither falsifies nor 
294 This is not merely a traditional Christian analysis. Japan only 
control pill in 1999, and only after protests from femimsts against its earher 
Viaera The long delay in the approval process for oral contraceptives is, no dou , 
ovefdetermined. Nevertheless, as reported in the American press, one stated reason by at 
least some part of the Japanese polity was the usual argument that "the pill wodd enc^age 
nromiscuitv and reduce reliance on condoms, leading to the spread of AIDS and other 
Lxually trLmitted diseases." Sheryl WuDunn, Japan, Never on the Pill, Seems Ready to Try 
-P- note 6, at 
Richard A. Posner, Sexual Behaviour, Disease, and Fertility Risk, 1 RISK DECISION 
e.g., Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Birth Rates at New Low as Teen Age Pregnancy Declin^, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29,1999, at A26; Fewer Unwed Mothers, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12,1996, at A22. 
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verifies either of Posner's two inconsistent predictions, because these 
statistics might just as well be due to wholly different factors, such as 
the aging of the population, the healthy economy, and the 
availability of several new forms of contraception. 
5. Sophisticated Falsification Redux 
Even if we accept Posner's claims to be able to distinguish 
between his assumptions and predictions, and to be engaging in 
falsification rather than verification, Posner is still not following his 
methodology. He claims that the "realism," or even the literal truth, 
of his assumptions is irrelevant. Nevertheless, when confronted with 
evidence that seems inconsistent with his thesis, he, on the one hand, 
vigorously defends the truth of his hypothesis and asserts the falsity 
of the alternative and, on the other hand, refuses to find his theory to 
be falsified. Rather, he engages in a form of ad hoc argument that 
can be seen as a muddled and flawed attempt at sophisticated 
falsification. 
As I have shown in Economic Rationalitywhen confronted 
by evidence that seems anomalous to his theory, Posner does not, as 
Lakatos requires, formulate auxiliary hypotheses to protect his hard 
core while accounting for the anomalies. Nor does Posner purport 
to do what Friedman suggests—continue to apply his theory, despite 
the fact that the conditions of its application might not be met on the 
grounds that people act "as if they were rational. Rather, Posner 
does precisely what he claims he should not do. He rejects his 
starting assiunptions concerning economic rationality and adopts a 
series of new assumptions concerning human behavior. The only 
thing that remains the same about Posner's assumptions is that he 
continues to label them "rationahty" even as the substance of the 
assumptions changes radically! 
Indeed, he does not engage in the process of prediction 
followed by attempted falsification at all.^'® Posner repeats 
Friedman's claim that the rationality postulate has been shown to be 
a good predictor of economic activity and stops with that. There are 
several problems with this—in addition to the obvious one that 
Posner does not specify what these studies might be. 
As I show in Economic Rationality,^'''^ Posner no longer uses, if 
in fact he ever did, Friedman's assumption of economic rationality. 
In other words, whether or not empirical investigation has shown 
that the theory that economic actors act as if they tried to maximize 
297 Schroeder, Economic Rationality, supra note 8. 
298 This charge is frequently made against Friedman as well. A full discussion is beyond the 
scope of this Article. 
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their utility based on a well-defined set of preferences and perfect 
costless information has been a good predictor of market behavior, 
this same evidence does not support the theory that economic actors 
act "as if they were constituted by a warring set of competing 
subselves, each with its own preferences, or "as if" their genes 
programmed them in a way that would have been beneficial out in 
the African plains five million years ago. Once Posner changes his 
theory (by changing his assumptions), Friedman's methodology 
requires that Posner make new predictions, which he would then 
seek to falsify through controlled observation of previously 
unobserved data, not by abduction and anecdote. 
Many economists dispute the empirical claim about the 
predictive power of the rationahty postulate. This dispute comes in 
two forms. The most common is the relatively simple assertion that 
whether or not the rationality postulate has been successful in 
making certain predictions, it does not accurately predict a wide 
variety of other economic activity-^articularly consumer behavior. 
Indeed, Blaug questions why so many economists have resisted ^y 
critique of the classic rationahty postulate given both the observation 
of anomalies and the existence of alternative theories of economic 
behavior.^"" 
Surely Posner must be aware that Simon, probably the foremost 
proponent of behavioral economics, began his empirical studies 
precisely because he believed that the traditional theory of economic 
rationality was an extremely poor predictor of firm behavior.^"^ He 
igil sought to understand how people actuaUy make decisions not merely 
to describe them, but also to develop a theory that would more 
.11, accurately predict behavior and provide the basis for making 
;; recommendations about human behavior. And, indeed, Simon 
offers a theory that combines the concepts of "bounded rationahty" 
-J and "satisficing" as an alternative to the neoclassical theory of full 
I rationahty and maximization.^"^ 
Indeed, the entire behavioral economics movement that Posner 
damns as untheoretic can be interpreted as showing that the 
traditional rationahty postulate indeed fails to predict consumer 
300 BLAUG,IMPRA note 18, at 233. Blaug states: • 
We conclude that the classic defense against criticisms of the rationahty 
postulate carries less conviction today than it did in the past. But so what? ... 
We do not discard a research program simply because it is subject to 
"anomalies" unless an alternative research program is available. However, such 
alternatives are in fact available 
Id. 
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behavior (such as the persistence of the sunk-cost fallacy), and the 
attempt either to develop auxiliary hypotheses to explain these 
aberrations, or to abduct a new "revolutionary" paradigm of 
economic behavior, which would then need to be tested further. 
Posner does not study economic theory in order to further our 
knowledge of economics. Rather, he purports to be using economic 
theory to justify a legal regime consistent with a politically 
conservative point of view. This justification depends on Posner s 
assertion that legal subjects act as economic actors not only in 
explicit markets, but in all (or almost all) human interactions, which 
are reinterpreted as shadow or unphcit markets. The assertion that a 
vision of "economic rationality" predicts pricing in markets is used to 
argue that the same vision of economic rationality will also explain 
sexual, political, and other activity and, therefore, the law should be 
such and such. The just so story of Posnerian jurisprudence does not 
merely try to justify the status quo, as did Kipling's. It aims also to 
justify changing the world in accordance with Posner's personal 
ideology. . • u ^ 
Finally, even if Posner were consistent in his assumptions about 
economic rationality and if he were also correct that economic 
rationality has been shown to be an excellent predictor of a wide 
variety of economic behavior, he still would not be a consistent 
follower of Friedmaniacal methodology. To repeat: Falsification 
theory holds that a theory is never finally proved, but always remains 
corrigible and fallible. When he suggests appropriate legal regimes, 
Posner engages in explicit and implicit predictions of past and future 
legal behavior by legal subjects. A truly scientific methodology 
would require Posner and his followers to then make observations in 
order to test these predictions. Not only does Posner not do so, he 
condemns JST's attempt to do so as being unscientific and 
untheoretical. 
So that's all right, Best Beloved. Do you see?^"^ 
303 KIPLING, supra note 1, at 109 (emphasis added). 
